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Abstract 
We examine theoretically and empirically social interactions in labor markets and how 
policy prescriptions can change dramatically when there are social interactions present. 
Spillover effects increase labor supply and conformity effects make labor supply 
perfectly inelastic at a reference group average. The demand for a good may also be influenced 
by either a spillover effect or a conformity effect. Positive spillover increases the demand for the 
good with interactions, and a conformity effect makes the demand curve pivot to become less 
price sensitive. Similar social interactions effects appear in the associated derived demands for 
labor. 
Individual and community factors may influence the average length of poverty spells. We 
measure local economic conditions by the county unemployment rate and neighborhood 
spillover effects by the racial makeup and poverty rate of the county. We find that moving an 
individual from one standard deviation above the mean poverty rate to one standard deviation 
below the mean poverty rate (from the inner city to the suburbs) lowers the average poverty spell 
by 20–25 percent. 
We further consider overall labor market outcomes by examining theoretically the 
socially optimal wealth distribution. Interdependence in utility can mitigate the need to transfer 
wealth to low-wage individuals and may require them to be poorer by all objective measures.  
Finally, we quantify how labor market policy changes when there are household social 
interactions. Labor supply estimates indicate positive economically important spillovers for adult 
U.S. men. Ignoring or incorrectly considering social interactions can mis-estimate the labor 
supply response of tax reform in the United States by as much as 60 percent. 
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1. 
Labor Markets With Social Interactions 
 There are two core research questions in the area of social interactions in the labor 
market. How do theoretical economic models and their associated econometric representations 
change when there are social interactions among households? How do policy implications 
change as the result of estimated households’ social interactions? We present a unified 
theoretical and empirical representation of social interactions as they pertain to labor supply and 
demand and demonstrate the cases where current policy prescriptions are greatly altered by the 
presence of social interactions. 
We begin by examining theoretically in Section 2 the effect of household 
interdependencies on how a researcher estimates and subsequently interprets labor supply and 
earnings equations. We consider two cases: (1) a positive spillover from others’ labor supplied 
and (2) a need for conformity with others’ labor supplied. Qualitative and quantitative 
comparative statics results with a Stone-Geary utility function demonstrate how spillover effects 
increase labor supply and earnings uniformly. Alternatively, conformity effects move labor 
supplied toward the mean of the reference group so that, in the limit, labor supply becomes 
perfectly inelastic at a reference group average labor supplied. When there are un-modeled 
exogenous social interactions, conventional wage elasticities are still relatively well estimated 
although structural parameters may not be. Omitting endogenous social interactions may 
seriously misrepresent the labor supply effects of policy. 
Having examined labor supply issues we then turn to the other side of the labor market in 
Section 3 and give theoretical attention to labor demand. We consider social interactions on the 
demand side in the context of a two-good economy with the household’s demand of one good 
 
3 
 
influenced by either a spillover effect from other consumers' choices or a conformity effect 
representing a need for making choices similar to others’. A positive spillover effect increases 
the demand for the consumer good with interactions, and a conformity effect makes the demand 
curve for the consumer good pivot around the average market demand to make demand less price 
sensitive. The collateral implication is that spillover in consumption increases the associated 
derived demand for labor and conformity in consumption makes the associated derived demand 
for labor less elastic. We also demonstrate how the presence of a good with social interactions 
affects the demand for the good without social interactions and the associated demand for the 
labor producing the no-interactions good. The implied results for the derived demands for labor 
have meaning for demand-based labor market policy such as the minimum wage, payroll tax, or 
targeted government expenditures underlying jobs creation programs. 
As a further demonstration how the presence of social interactions complicates thinking 
about economic policy we consider overall labor market outcomes and related economic policy 
further in Section 4 by examining theoretically the socially optimal wealth distribution. We 
develop the optimal policy within a two-person two-good model with heterogeneous workers and 
asymmetric social interactions where only one (social) individual derives positive or negative 
utility from the leisure of the other (non-social) individual. An outcome is that interdependence 
might mitigate the need to transfer wealth to low-wage individuals and instead lead them to be 
poorer by all objective measures. In the presence of social interactions policy to minimize wealth 
inequality may not be an optimum. 
An important aspect of labor market outcomes is how individual and community factors 
may influence the average length of poverty spells in ways that can enhance the poverty fighting 
effects of income transfer programs. In Section 5 we measure local economic conditions by the 
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county unemployment rate and neighborhood spillover effects by the racial makeup and poverty 
rate of the county. We find that moving an individual from one standard deviation above the 
mean poverty rate to one standard deviation below the mean poverty rate (from the inner city to 
the suburbs) lowers the average poverty spell by 20–25 percent; the poverty spillover effect is 
equal in magnitude to the effect of changing the household head from female to male.  
Lastly, we generalize how economic policy issues related to labor market outcomes are 
changed when there are household social interactions to consider and what we know about the 
importance of households’ labor supply interactions. In particular, in Section 6 we flesh out the 
econometric details of implementing an empirical model with possible social interactions in 
labor supply. We look for a response of a person's hours worked to hours worked in the labor 
market reference group, which includes those with similar age, family structure, and location. 
We identify endogenous spillovers by instrumenting average hours worked in the reference 
group with hours worked in neighboring reference groups. Estimates of the canonical labor 
supply model indicate positive economically important spillovers for adult U.S. men. The 
estimated total wage elasticity of labor supply is 0.22, where 0.08 is the exogenous wage change 
effect and 0.14 is the social interactions effect. We demonstrate how ignoring or incorrectly 
considering social interactions can mis-estimate the labor supply response of tax reform in the 
United States by as much as 60 percent. 
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2. Labor Supply With Social Interactions 
 Ever since the well-known paper on the rat race in the workplace (Akerlof 1976) there 
has been an increasing interest in how workers interact with each other beyond the indirect 
market interactions determining wages and labor contracts. Recent models of social interactions 
in the labor market setting range from a conformity effect (Nakamoto 2009) to envy (Kragl and 
Schmid 2009). The strong interest in modeling preference interdependence is warranted by both 
the experimental evidence and empirical research, which point to meaningful and non-negligible 
social interactions effects in the labor market where workers make interact with multiple motives 
(Fehr, Goette, and Zehnder 2009). The research shows that because of compensation or status 
concerns the effort level is strongly affected even if there are no monetary incentives to perform 
better than co-workers (Falk and Ichino 2006, Mas and Moretti 2009). Our research in the 
section to follow, first presented in Grodner and Kniesner (2006), examines the potential 
quantitative labor supply effects of two types of interactions in utility, spillover from others’ 
decisions and conformity with others’ decisions. 
 Social interactions are of much policy relevance for taxation programs or policies 
directed toward improving the well-being of the unemployed if the social reference group’s 
mean value affects the outcome of interest to the individual (Blomquist 1993). When there are 
substantial amounts of socially interactive decisions in the form of, for example, positive 
spillovers, then there will be a social multiplier effect to consider in optimal policy design as 
individuals react to the actions of others (Becker and Murphy 2000, Glaeser, Sacerdote, and 
Scheinkman 2002). 
 Our theoretical research in Grodner and Kniesner (2006) bridges theoretical and 
econometric considerations in household models where non-ignorable social interactions may be 
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present. We use the convenient Stone-Geary utility function, which leads to the easily estimable 
linear earnings function, and demonstrate that even when we introduce a relatively low level of 
social interaction in utility it can cause an economically significant effect on an individual’s 
labor supply (and consumption). Ignoring social interactions can cause a serious bias on the 
estimated structural (utility function) parameters of interest. We also identify situations when 
other economic concepts that depend on combinations of biased structural parameters, such as 
labor supply/consumption derivatives and elasticities, may or may not be accurately estimated. 
The shifts of the labor supply function are general qualitatively for any utility function with 
imbedded social utility components and with leisure as a normal good (Grodner 2003); the 
calibrated Stone-Geary utility function lets us quantify the results. 
2.1 Theoretical Framework 
 We build on the a flexible treatment of social interactions formulated by Brock and 
Durlauf (2001a,b), where interactions enter into a model with total utility, V(), encompassing a 
social utility term, S(), and individual utility term, u(): 
 V=V(u(),S())         (2.1) 
Our starting point is the model without interactions (baseline, without S()); we then discuss 
forms of interdependence. 
 Our focus throughout is on labor supply using the Stone-Geary utility function. The 
Stone-Geary has convenient properties for estimating labor supply and consumption 
expenditures. Because the earnings function is linear in the wage rate and non-labor income, w 
and Y, and the associated labor supply function is linear in 1/w and Y/w, similar social 
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interactions effects appear in other widely used utility functions (Stern 1986).
1
 The Stone-Geary 
has also been shown to be a convenient functional form for studying issues related to 
intertemporal substitution and risk sharing (Ogaki and Zhang 2001, Low 2005, Low and 
Maldoom 2004). Stone-Geary utility easily admits social interactions in a natural way through its 
structural parameters. Kooreman and Schoonbeek (2004) and Abel (2005) prove conditions for 
the existence of welfare improvements over the market equilibrium case with interdependence 
and the implied optimal taxes that mitigate negative effects of social interactions. 
 We begin with the baseline utility function without interactions: 
 ( , ) ln( ) (1 )ln( )h cU h c h c              (2.2)  
   st. c wh Y  , 0 1  , 
where c is consumption, h is hours worked,  is the expenditure share on leisure (l = T – h, with l 
being leisure and T being total hours available), 
h  is the level of maximum feasible hours of 
work, and 
c  is the minimum necessary commodity consumption. 
 An econometric advantage of the Stone-Geary (2.2) is that after maximizing utility with 
respect to consumption and labor supplied the optimal hours worked imply that earnings are 
linear in both the variables and parameters (Abbott and Ashenfelter 1976): 
 
0( ) ( (1 )) ( )c h w Ywh w Y w Y              .     (2.3) 
 The three parameters of the utility function are exactly identified as estimates of               
(
0 , ,w Y   ) reveal ( , ,h c   ). We will refer to the earnings function in (2.3) as the Stone-Geary 
                                               
1. Obvious ones are utility and labor supply functions linear in [w, Y], [lnw, lnY], or [w, w
2
, Y, 
Y
2
, (wY)]. 
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without interactions or, more simply, as the baseline model, which is always the point of 
comparison. The wage effect on labor supply in our benchmark case is 
 
(1 )
/ h
h
h w
w
  
   .        (2.4) 
 Because the models quickly become complicated, most theoretical studies involving 
social interactions use a specific functional form, which can still permit quite general conclusions 
about social interaction effects (Bernheim 1994, Akerlof 1997, Akerlof and Kranton 2000). The 
Stone-Geary utility function encompasses much of the previous theoretical research on social 
interactions and is a convenient objective function for introducing social interactions in a 
theoretically satisfactory way. We follow the approach known as demographic translating where 
the demographic characteristics of the individuals reside inside the parameter representing the 
limit value for hours of work, 
h (Pollak and Wales 1992). 
2.2 Spillover Effects 
 We embed the social utility (spillover) effect into the parameter h  , using the 
specification suggested by Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b), 
1( ( ))h h hS h      , where h  is the 
expectation (perhaps sample mean) of hours worked by the reference group members. The 
reference group is any set of other individuals in the population to which the person refers when 
making a labor supply decision. The parameter 1  represents the importance of social utility 
(spillover) to the individual so that now 
 1( , ; ) ln( ) (1 )ln( )h h h cU h c h h c            .     (2.5) 
 The spillover effect can be viewed as a positive externality generated by the labor 
supplied in the reference group, where a higher mean of hours worked in the reference group 
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decreases the individual’s disutility from working. An obvious way to interpret the spillover 
effect is that someone feels less pain from working if he or she knows others also work.
2
 
 Maximizing (2.5) with respect to c and h yields the augmented earnings function 
 1 1
1
{ } { (1 ) } { } ( ) ( )
(1 )
c h c h h
h
w Y Y
wh
         
 
     


.    (2.6) 
The curly brackets {} contain terms from the baseline model. Note that the addition of spillover 
effects adds two variables to the earnings equation, 
h  and hY , makes the earnings equation 
nonlinear, and over-identifies the parameters. 
 When the base utility function is Stone-Geary incorporating spillovers from others’ work 
efforts, the wage effect on labor supply is 
 1
1
{ (1 ) }
/
{ }
h h
h
h h
h w
w w
   
 
  
  

.       (2.7) 
Note that 2
1/ 0h w      so that labor supply spillover effects make the individual’s response to 
the wage more positive than in the absence of spillovers. For the interested reader a game-
theoretic justification for social norms in consumption appears in Young (1998) and Soetevent 
and Kooreman (2002).  
                                               
2. Such a positive externality is recognized in different contexts in social psychology. Under the 
rule of reciprocation one feels equally deserving of outcomes in the reference group (Cialdini 
1993). In cultural spillover the more society legitimates long work hours the more people work 
to gain social approval (Baron and Straus 1989). In behavioral therapy a person feels relief from 
trauma when he or she knows that others had similar negative experiences (Hawkins and Eagger 
1999). 
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2.3 Conformity Effects 
 Conformity in behavior and attitudes is a fundamental concept in social psychology 
(Sherif 1935). The general idea is that individuals tend to conform to broadly defined social 
norms and the magnitude of response depends on cohesiveness, group size, and social support.
3
 
Again, we embed the interdependence via the parameter 
h   of the baseline utility function so 
that 
2
2( ( )) ( / 2)( )h h hS h       . Augmented utility is 
 2 2
2
( , ; ) ln( ( ) ) (1 ) ln( )h h h cU h c h h c

            .    (2.8) 
 The practical implication of a conformity effect in utility is that the person feels penalized 
when working a different amount of hours than what is typical for the reference group. 
Intuitively, because there is a penalty for differing from the conformity value for h, the utility 
function incorporating conformity in (2.8) should have a smoothing effect on hours relative to 
the baseline model. The smoothing effect of conformity should in turn mean that a change in h 
will have a smaller effect on utility than in the baseline case with an accompanying regression 
toward the group mean. 
 The augmented earnings function with a conformity effect is 
2
2
2
2 2 2
2 2
{ } { (1 ) } { } ( ) ( ) ( 1)
(1 (1 ) )
c h c h h h
h
wh
w Y h h Y w
h


          
  

         
  
.   (2.9) 
 In the case of conformity the spillover effect introduced into the earnings function via the 
presence of h  is replaced by ( )hh  . Again, the conformity version of the earning function is 
non-linear, but now more complicated in that there is not a simple (linear) closed-form solution 
                                               
3. For an interesting discussion of the costs and benefits to society of conformity versus non-
conformity see Sunstein (2002). 
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for either earnings or hours of work. The underlying fundamental parameters are again over-
identified as there are more interaction terms and non-linearity due to the presence of both the 
individual’s labor supplied and the reference group’s average hours worked. 
 The wage effect on labor supply when there is a conformity effect is 
 
2
2
2 2
{(1 ) } ( )((1 ) (1 ) )
{ } ( ) ((1 ) )
h h h
c h
h h hh
w w Y w h
     
    
      

     
,    (2.10) 
where the terms in curly brackets { } again indicate the basic Stone-Geary model. 
 Even in the Stone-Geary case the expression for the effect of the wage on labor supplied 
is lengthy, and without specific assumptions it is impossible to determine the labor supply 
function effects of conformity compared with the baseline case. 
2.4 Stone-Geary Utility and Linear Expenditure System with Interactions 
 Earlier we noted that the Stone-Geary utility function is convenient for its simplicity and 
relative flexibility. However, most research that includes social interactions into the LES does 
not distinguish among different forms of interactions, such as spillover versus conformity, and 
the interactions are not modeled as related to the individual’s demand for the particular good. 
Using the notation we introduced earlier, most research implicitly uses ( , )h hS S     . Our 
work can then be viewed as an extension of the LES with interactions where the individual’s 
choice affects the level at which one responds to the choices of others. Our extension is 
reasonable because we contend that people are more likely to care about the actions of others in 
their reference group if the particular activity makes a significant contribution to the individual’s 
utility. Here we take ( , , )h hS h h     for the particular case of spillover and 
2( , , ) ( / 2)( )h hS h h      for the particular case of conformity. The most common LES model 
with interactions to date, which uses ( , )h hS    , then closely resembles our spillover effect. 
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 Finally, in further relation to the past literature on the LES with interactions we also 
distinguish between exogenous and endogenous interactions as represented by the presence of 
h . By considering endogeneity as an issue we attempt to include the concept of a social 
multiplier into a popular parametric utility specification used in studies of interdependence in 
consumption and labor supply. 
2.5 Exogenous Social Interactions 
 We now present the details of labor supply with versus without social interactions in 
utility. We first compute the basic Stone-Geary utility function and then add spillover or 
conformity. Last we compute the labor supply functions and elasticities. The end product is an 
enhanced understanding of the relative effect of social interactions in the individual’s preferences 
on the labor supply outcomes. The conclusions in the following sections concerning spillover 
and conformity are general in that only the magnitudes differ for various functional forms 
(Grodner 2003). We select the Stone-Geary utility function form mainly for tractability. 
2.6 How Social Interactions Shift Labor Supply 
 We begin by creating results comparable to Blomquist (1993) who computes hours of 
work for given wage rates and selected magnitudes of interactions. The values for hours of work 
we will discuss have been computed using the solutions for desired h from the three earnings 
functions, (2.3), (2.6), and (2.9), with numerical details described. In the case of the baseline 
model versus spillover, computing labor supply is a straightforward manipulation of the earnings 
function. In the case of the baseline versus conformity, deriving labor supply involves the 
solution to the quadratic function for earnings with respect to h. 
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2.6.1 Calibration 
 To begin, we need values for the parameters of the utility function: 
h  (maximum 
feasible hours of work), 
c  (minimum necessary consumption),   (proportion of full income 
implicitly spent on leisure), and the moments of the distributions for the independent variables: Y 
(non-labor income) and w (hourly wage). We calibrate the model using data from a well-known 
econometric study that examines the Stone-Geary based labor supply model (Abbott and 
Ashenfelter 1976, 1979). 
 Here 0.113   based on our own regression estimates with the data of Abbott and 
Ashenfelter. Our other econometric parameter estimates include minimum consumption, 
636c  , and maximum hours of work, 2465h  . The remaining calibration values we use are 
the mean of annual hours of work needed for spillover and conformity effects in labor supply, 
ˆ 2172hh   , and the sample means ($1967) of non-labor income, Y   $733, and the hourly 
wage rate, w   $0.77. Note that 2172 is not the exact mean of hours worked in the data, but 
rather hours worked at the mean wage and mean non-labor income using our estimation results 
from the Stone-Geary earnings function. We force labor supply through the mean hours worked 
at the mean wage rate, which the earnings function itself need not do. Finally, note that the slope 
of labor supply is positive here. 
 The three labor supply functions that we examine numerically are 
 Baseline (rearranged equation (2.3)) 
 (1 )c h
Y
h
w w
 
     .        (2.11) 
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 Spillover (rearranged equation (2.6)) 
 1
1
{ (1 ) } { } ( )
{ }(1 )
c h c h
h
w Y Y
h
w
       
 
    


.     (2.12) 
 Conformity (positive value after finding the solution to the quadratic equation in (2.9)) 
 2
1
( 4 )
2
h b b ac
a
    ,        (2.13) 
where 
 
2
2
2
2 2 2
2
22
{ }(1 )
( ( 1) { })
[{ (1 ) } (1 ) { ( )}( 1)]
h c
h h c h
a w
b w Y
c w w Y



      
       
 
   
      
 
 We compute results for the two different interactions specifications with differing 
magnitudes of spillover and conformity effects as represented by the numerical value for the 
parameter 
i . For simplicity we use 1 0.00001   to represent a small amount of spillover and 
(double it to) 1 0.00002   to represent much greater spillover.
4
 For comparability we consider 
results for low versus high conformity effects, 2   0.005, and twice its value, 2   0.01.
5
 It is 
important to recognize that 1  and 2  are not connected; they are totally different parameters 
governing two separate models of social interactions. 
 To understand labor supply with social interactions we present our results graphically. 
Figure 2.1 shows that spillover creates mostly a parallel rightward shift in the labor supply 
function where the magnitude of the shift depends on the value of 1 . Spillover leads to more 
                                               
4. A small value for 1 is close to 0; the limiting value is 1/2172 = 0.00046 because leisure is a 
normal good. 
5. Here a small value for 2 is again close to zero, but there is no obvious maximum. 
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labor supplied and a similar wage responsiveness of labor supply with and without spillover.
6
 
Figure 2.2 illustrates that conformity causes labor supplied to tend toward the mean of the 
reference group, 
h . Workers with h < h in the absence of conformity work more hours under 
conformity, and workers with h > h in the absence of conformity work fewer hours under 
conformity. As the importance of conformity in the utility function ( 2 ) rises, labor supply 
becomes steeper and less elastic. The conclusions for both spillover and conformity are general 
in that only the magnitudes differ for various functional forms (Grodner 2003, Grodner and 
Kniesner 2006, Appendix A). 
2.7 Estimation Bias When Spillover Is Present But Ignored 
 To determine the effect of the unmodeled social interactions in a hypothetical empirical 
study we first need to consider what kind of data and estimator are to be used. As a starting point 
it seems reasonable to assume that the norms individuals refer to may be related to behavior (a) 
of their own in the past (time series), (b) of other individuals in the present (cross-section), or (c) 
both (panel data). If the levels of the norms vary across individuals, it means that 
h  from (2.5) 
or (8) may be group-specific or even individual specific. Each case would require a specific data 
set and the appropriate estimation technique. 
 One interesting example is the case of the family members being the reference group for 
each other (Neumark and Postlewaite 1998). The idea has both theoretical foundation and 
reasonably good quality data available for testing it. In a family reference group situation the 
model would be similar to the approach used in studies of the Rotten Kid Theorem (Becker 
                                               
6. Notice that the point elasticity changes because the person chooses higher hours of work at a 
given wage. 
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1981). One of the model's predictions is that dividing income equally is usually not family 
welfare maximizing. In our setup we would consider the effect of the overall family non-work 
time on each individual's labor supply. The difficulty of the research would be in identifying the 
effect of the social interaction from the effect of the public good in the household due to the 
benefits of living together. In his review article Bergstrom (1997) discusses how interactions 
within the family can affect the behavior of the individuals in the household, Jenkins and Osberg 
(2003) investigate social interactions within the family as a leisure coordination problem, and 
Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2005) find that Europeans may work less than Americans 
because of regulations that enable Europeans to take vacations at the same time, which raises the 
satisfaction from vacations and induces more vacation time. 
 In the following discussion we assume the simplest possibility: the same norm for every 
person. It is the most basic case relevant for the cross-sectional data. Although constant 
h  may 
be unrealistic, it is instructive and relatively easy to examine. 
 When the reference group is the population the relevant comparison point is 
h , which is 
the same for every person. Because there is no variation in the reference group in our simple 
example, 
h  becomes another parameter in the utility function, so we call it a distorted Stone-
Geary. The system in terms of the structural parameters is exactly identified, so the linear labor 
earnings equation with spillover (2.6) is 
 
1
{ (1 ) }
{ } { }
(1 )
h
c
h
w
wh Y
 
  
 
 
   
 
.       (2.14) 
 From (2.14) we see that a consequence of ignoring positive spillover and estimating the 
linear earnings regression in (2.3) versus the correct non-linear earnings function in (2.14) is an 
upward bias in the coefficient of the wage, w , by 11/(1 )h  . Ignoring positive spillovers in 
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turn produces an upward bias in 
1
ˆ ˆˆ ( /(1 ) /(1 )h w Y h h          because 10 (1 ) 1h    .
7
 
When the spillover in hours is ignored incorrectly two of the structural parameters are correctly 
estimated as ˆ( ) 0E    , ˆ( ) 0c cE    . The third is not since 1 1ˆ( ) ( /(1 ))h h h hE          is 
the proportional upward bias in the estimated value of 
h . 
 Note that replacing ˆ
h  with the estimated value of 1/(1 )h h    in the slope of the 
baseline model yields 
 1
(1 )
ˆ (1 )ˆ (1 )
h
hh
misspecified correct
baseline spillover
hhh h
w w w w

           
     
    
.   (2.15) 
As long as the researcher uses the correct slope formula implied by the assumed model, even 
incorrectly omitting spillover need not affect a result of interest. The baseline earnings function 
approximates the spillover model. 
 Unbiasedness of 0̂  and 
ˆ
Y  extends to other earnings/labor supply functions when the 
estimated coefficients are not a function of 
h . When spillover does not have a linear form then 
all coefficients can be biased in undetermined ways (Grodner 2003).  
2.8 Estimation Bias When Conformity Is Present But Ignored 
 When there is a conformity effect we cannot solve for the bias in the structural 
parameters inferred from the estimated regression coefficients of a linear labor earnings function 
ignoring social interactions. The difficulty in establishing bias analytically happens because the 
                                               
7. Another way to view the issue is that if 
h
  varies across individuals due to the presence of 
h
  
but 
h
  is treated as a constant we have what amounts to an incorrectly specified random 
parameters model. 
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conformity case (2.9) cannot be solved explicitly for earnings, and the associated labor supply 
function (2.12) is non-linear in the wage and non-labor income. 
 From Figure 2.2 we can deduce the bias to the coefficients in the labor supply or earnings 
functions. Because we know that conformity makes labor supply flatter the dependent variable, 
hours of work, has less variation. In the limit labor supply becomes constant. As a consequence, 
all coefficients that are not a function of 
h  will be zero. In the particular case of the Stone-
Geary earnings function 0
ˆ 0  ,  ˆ 0Y  , and 
ˆ
w h  . The inferred structural parameters 
will also be biased in that ˆ 0  , ˆ 0c  , and   ˆh h  . 
2.9 Summary: Estimation Bias From Ignoring Exogenous Social Interaction 
 The fact that the bias to the baseline coefficients is different when spillover or conformity 
effects are present, but ignored, underlines the need for a precise modeling of interactions 
effects. For example, a researcher cannot simply include 
h  into the regression to control for the 
omitted variable bias. If the interactions are exogenous, though, we believe that using a so-called 
partly linear regression model will suffice to control for social interactions of unknown 
functional form (Yatchew 2003). 
 So far our discussion has taken the expectation of hours worked for others in the 
individual’s reference group, h, as an exogenous social norm. The consequence of the social 
norm interpretation is that social interactions are effectively a response by the individual to the 
labor supply of the reference group. The difficulty of estimating labor supply with exogenous 
social interactions comes from the likelihood that the researcher does not know what h is for an 
individual (omitted variable bias) or mis-specifies how h enters the labor supply function 
algebraically (incorrect functional form bias). We have demonstrated how the presence of 
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exogenous positive spillover social interactions shifts out the labor supply schedule and how 
exogenous conformity social interactions pivots labor supply to approach a constant hours 
worked that is the group norm. Now we consider what happens to labor supply when h is 
endogenous. 
2.10 Endogenous Social Interactions and Economic Policy 
 For the intuition behind an endogenous h consider a worker who, in addition to being 
directly affected by the social norm in the reference group (in the form of average hours 
worked), now can also affect the social norm by changing labor supplied (which in turn affects 
reference group average hours worked). In addition to the direct wage effect there is also an 
indirect effect through feedback from the other ( 1)n  members of the reference group. Because 
it is the case that 
1,
/( 1)
n
h i jj i j
h h n       the labor supply model within each reference 
group becomes a simultaneous system as the labor supply of each member enters into the labor 
supply of all other members. Now the interactions no longer depend on an exogenous social 
norm, but rather on an endogenous social norm that is jointly determined by all the members of 
the reference group. Practically speaking, h becomes an endogenous variable such that an 
increase in the labor supply of each reference group member increases the mean hours worked in 
the reference group, and when the other members of the group respond to the change of the 
overall mean there is a feedback effect to the person who initially changed labor supply. 
 There are two situations to consider: (a) only the individual’s wage changes and (b) the 
wage change is general to the reference group such that each member experiences the same wage 
change. The size of the reference group also plays a crucial role concerning the wage effects in 
the two situations of person-specific versus group-wide wage changes. With person-specific 
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wage effects, / 0i ih h    as n increases so that in large groups the endogenous feedback effect 
is negligible and can be ignored in evaluating the labor supply effects of policies that alter the 
wage.
8
 Group-wide wage effects make the researcher consider, however, that 
 / ( / ) | ( / )( / )
i
i i i i i i i ih
h w h w h h h w

           .     (2.16) 
Represented more completely in a schematic the social interactions process looks like 
 
( / )( / )| ( / )
1 1
( / )
...
h wi i i ii ih i
i i
h w h h
e
i i i i i i
h h
w h h h h h

  

  
 
 
       .      (2.17) 
 When the interactions are exogenous / 0i ih h   ; changes in individual hours worked 
do not affect average hours worked because average hours worked are at the norm. When the 
interactions are endogenous and there is only an individual’s wage change, / 0i ih h    due to 
the feedback effect, but /i ih h   tends to zero as the number of reference group members 
increases (Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman 2002). With both exogenous and endogenous 
interactions and an individual wage change, the wage causes only a ( / ) |
i
i i h
h w

   change in 
hours worked because ih  does not change (much) so that we have exogeneity in the sense of no 
observable feedback effect for large groups. 
 When the interactions are endogenous and ( / )i ih h   is non-negligible the individual 
experiences not only an exogenous effect that is ( / ) |
i
i i h
h w

   but also an endogenous effect that 
is ( / )( / )i i i ih h h w     . The schematic in (2.17) emphasizes that an endogenous effect is first 
                                               
8. Specifically, 
i
h

 is a weighted mean with weights 1/n, and in larger groups an individual’s 
contribution of 
i
h  to 
i
h

 ( j i  ) is negligible because (1/n)  0 as n  . 
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triggered by the exogenous change in the wage rate ( / )i ih w  , and then the endogenous change 
continues on its own through the circular feedback effects ( / )i ih h   until the labor market 
reaches an equilibrium hours worked, 
e
ih .
9
 
 One way to have a non-negligible /i ih h  , which makes endogenous social interactions 
matter, is when there is a general wage change so that each person experiences the same 
iw . 
Even a small 
iw  can generate a significant aggregate effect on hours worked, ih . Therefore, 
ih  for each person will initially change by exactly ih , and the effect /i ih h   will no longer 
be negligible. An increase in the number of reference group members means that /i ih h   
decreases for each person because it is distributed across more workers, in turn making the 
aggregate effect, /i ih h  , the same no matter what n is. Regardless of the size of the reference 
group the labor supply effect through /i ih h   will be the same for a given iw . If we represent 
aggregate changes in terms of the changes in the average hours worked and average wage, the 
total effect is 
 
,
( / ) ( / ) | (( / ) | ))(( / ) | )w wh h w w h hh w h w h h h w             .
10
   (2.18) 
                                               
9. There are certain additional conditions that need be satisfied for existence, uniqueness, and 
stability of equilibrium. The explicit Stone-Geary utility function guarantees a unique stable 
equilibrium. For more discussion see Brock and Durlauf (2001b). 
10. As a practical note, in our simulations we first compute 
,
/ |
h h w w
h w
 
   by taking 
h
 as 
constant, calculating /h w  , and then setting 
h
h  . We also compute /h w   by first setting 
h
h  , then taking /h w  . Thus, the total effect on the left-hand side of (2.16) and the 
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Up to now we have considered the first term in (2.16) compared to a model that 
incorrectly ignores exogenous social interactions (equations (2.11)–(2.13) and Figures 2.1 and 
2.2). We now turn our attention to the two specific algebraic forms of (2.16) capturing spillover 
and conformity. In particular, we numerically examine the relative size of the total effect /h w   
and the exogenous effect 
,
( / )
h h w w
h w
 
   in (2.16), which reveals by how much the labor supply 
wage effect differs when one now considers group-wide wage changes that alter the labor supply 
reference point for the individual. 
In what follows we compute 
,
( / ) /( / ) |
h h w w
m h w h w
 
     , which is sometimes called a 
social multiplier because it measures how much the total change differs from the exogenous 
change due to an exogenous shock (Becker and Murphy 2000, Glaeser et al. 2003). When there 
are no interactions or interactions are exogenous the social multiplier equals 1. The multiplier 
also connects labor supply elasticities as: ( ) ( )endogenous m exogenous   . 
Empirically it is critical to identify the social multiplier because a researcher can estimate 
only ( )exogenous  correctly (Aronsson et al. 1999). A researcher can control for exogenous 
interactions by including a nonlinear function for 
h . For endogenous interactions, one not only 
needs a nonlinear function of 
h  but also must worry about the endogeneity of h  and the 
degree of the feedback effect. 
                                                                                                                                                       
exogenous effect in the first term on the right-hand side are only the same when either 0
h
   or 
0
i
  . Note also that (2.16) is a particular form of the decomposition introduced by Becker and 
Murphy (2000, p. 13) for a demand for goods and services. 
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2.11 The Wage Effect When the Spillover Effect Is Endogenous 
 In the case of spillover with Stone-Geary utility, the social multiplier with endogenous 
social interaction is  
2
1
1 1
2
1
1
(1 )
2 ( ) 1
(1 )
1 1
/ (1 )
( / ) | (1 ) ( ( ))
h
c
c
h h
w w h Y
h h
ch h w w h
w w
h w w h
m
h w w h wh Y
  
  
  


   
  
  
  
 

  
  
     
.   (2.19) 
We have numerically simulated the labor supply implications of different levels of the spillover 
effect ( 1 ). The social multiplier when there is endogenous spillover increases with the level of 
interactions, and the increase becomes more than proportional for high levels of interactions, 
which suggests that the feedback effect works longer or the changes are larger. For spillovers 
where 1 0.00001   the wage effect is about two percent greater when spillover effects are 
endogenous; when the spillover importance increases 10 times to where 1 0.0001  , the wage 
effect is 40 percent (or about 20 times) larger when spillover effects are endogenous.  
It is helpful to reinforce the social multiplier under social interactions by considering it 
graphically in Figure 2.3. When we consider the shift of the labor demand curve from D0 to D1, 
the equilibrium moves from point A to point B (exogenous change: hB − hA) and then from point 
B to point C (endogenous change: hC − hB). The endogenous change comes from the fact that the 
exogenous change increased equilibrium labor supply to hB and so the reference hours worked μh 
increased also (feedback effect). Absent exogenous social interactions labor market equilibrium 
would be at P. 
Our measure of the importance of endogenous social interactions in (2.17), which 
represents by how much higher the effect of the wage change on the labor supply is when 
interactions are endogenous than when the interactions are exogenous, is essentially the ratio of 
the total change to the exogenous change in hours worked, or (hC  hA)/(hB  hA) in Figure 2.3. 
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Moreover, if one uses individual data and does not control for interactions, one will incorrectly 
observe total change as to hB (multiplier = 1). On the other hand, if one uses aggregate data, one 
observes correctly the total change as to hC. The logic follows Glaeser et al. (2003) who 
demonstrate both theoretically and empirically that the level of aggregation can reveal the 
existence of social interactions in the data. Our discussion also formalizes a point made by 
Blomquist (1993) who notes that the researcher needs to consider the effect of interdependence 
when data are disaggregated.
11
 
2.12 The Wage Effect When the Conformity Effect Is Endogenous 
 When there is conformity in the Stone-Geary case the social multiplier with endogenous 
social interaction is 
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2 2
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 
.     (2.20) 
We have numerically simulated the labor supply implications of various levels of the 
conformity effect ( 2 ).We find that proportionate increases in 2  match proportionate increases 
in the social multiplier. The social multiplier under endogenous conformity increases 
proportionally with the level of interactions largely because the wage effect with endogenous 
conformity does not depend on 2 . 
                                               
11. The multiplier computed in Glaeser et al. (2003) at different levels of aggregation can be 
interpreted in our framework as if only part of the population experienced an exogenous wage 
change, and the researcher observes the equilibrium somewhere between B and C. When the 
entire population has the exogenous wage change the multiplier in Glaeser et al. coincides with 
our total change multiplier so that our result extends theirs. 
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2.13 Implications for Research and Policy 
In the presence of endogenous social interaction effects there are two components of the 
change in hours worked due to a wage change. The first component of interactions is exogenous, 
which increases the labor supply effect due to the wage changes relative to the situation with no 
social interactions. The second component is due to the endogeneity of h, which further 
increases the wage effect. The total wage effect that includes endogenous spillover may be large 
relative to the baseline case of no social interactions, and the bias in labor supply wage effects 
may be even larger from ignoring social interactions. If the ultimate goal is to use structural 
parameters of labor supply in simulations of policy, such as income tax reforms, the researcher 
investigating social interaction effects empirically needs to determine not only whether social 
interactions are present but also whether they are exogenous or endogenous. When interactions 
are exogenous the results from a mis-specified model can still be useful for policy evaluations. 
When interactions are endogenous the results from a mis-specified model can be quite 
misleading because the researcher cannot correctly identify elasticities (See Aronsson, 
 lomquist, and Sackl n 1999 for an example). The result is more important because even the 
introduction of a flexible functional form will not solve the problem. Not taking into account the 
multiplier will likely understate the true effect. 
If there are exogenous social interactions the individual wage effect will be higher for 
spillover but the elasticity can be well estimated. If spillovers become endogenous the wage 
effect on labor supply will be higher than when spillovers are exogenous although the 
implications for relative point elasticities are unclear. When there is exogenous conformity the 
wage effects become smaller. Practically speaking, when there are social interactions in the form 
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of spillover there is an externality effect that makes behavioral responses to any policy induced 
wage change stronger. Endogeneity of spillovers further strengthens the policy impact.  
Considering all the theoretical implications of social interactions, to make reliable 
inferences for policy evaluations a researcher must still decide which behavioral effects to use in 
the particular situation. Ideally the researcher concerned with labor supply-wage issues would 
want to have the correct individual effect, ( / )indivh w  , along with the social interactions effect, 
( / )socialhh   , to reveal the total effect, ( / )
totalh w  . However, decomposing the total wage 
effect into its two components may be infeasible because the researcher may not know the 
functional form for social interactions or whether they are exogenous or endogenous. 
2.14 Summary 
Our research has provided evidence concerning the possible bias in estimating labor 
supply that may stem from the situation where there are un-modeled social interactions present. 
We considered cases of positive spillover and conformity in hours worked both analytically and 
numerically. The social interaction effects and their consequences we identify are relevant not 
only for social interactions in labor supply but also for social interactions in consumer demand, 
particularly for the Stone-Geary based linear goods and services expenditures and labor earnings 
system. 
 The results that there is a positive shift of labor supply due to spillover and a pivoting of 
the labor supply schedule due to conformity are relatively general for concave utility functions 
with two goods and most likely in models with many goods as well (Grodner 2003; Grodner and 
Kniesner 2006, Appendix A). Depending on the functional form of utility and the social utility 
term the exact changes in the labor supply schedule due to social interactions may differ, 
although the general patterns remain as we present. Calibration and usage of the popular Stone-
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Geary utility function lets us connect the ideas of social interactions to the empirical studies in 
the literature, relate our work to past research on the LES with interactions, and underline the 
economic significance of different forms and levels of interdependence. The implications of 
interactions related to specific functional forms of social utility extend to other theoretical 
specifications of total utility. 
Our results suggest that the bias in the parameters of interest from ignoring social 
interactions can be economically significant and will differ depending on the form and 
magnitude of the interactions. Even if one correctly knows the reference group for each 
individual, adding the reference group’s mean hours of work to the regressor list may not be 
enough to control for the presence of social interactions because the mean hours of work for the 
reference group may enter non-linearly. Still, something can be learned about the form of social 
interactions if the researcher can compare results of a badly mis-specified model with the true or 
closer-to-true model. For example, if the mis-specified model fits the data well then the relative 
parameters, such as elasticity, can still be accurately estimated. 
When there are unmodeled exogenous interactions the estimated structural parameters are 
biased but elasticities are well estimated. The potential solution is a flexible functional form. 
However, when interactions are endogenous both parameters and elasticities are incorrect. The 
possible solution is not only a flexible functional form but also a way to estimate the multiplier. 
Testing for endogenous versus exogenous interactions and specific solutions are fruitful topics 
for future research. 
We contend that because a researcher usually uses micro data for demand or supply 
estimation our insights are of interest to those involved in applied microeconomic studies where 
social interaction may be present. We have also demonstrated that our work connects to as well 
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as extends established results in the literature and have developed more generally the concept of 
the social multiplier. 
There are different effects on labor supply generated by the different forms that social 
interactions may take. There is sometimes confusion among economists about the exact meaning 
of concepts acquired from other disciplines (Manski 2000), and sometimes economists are not 
clear that the broad term social interactions may encompass many different types of behavior. 
We have attempted to demonstrate the important differences between endogenous and 
exogenous spillover versus exogenous and endogenous conformity effects in labor supply. The 
discussion highlights the research value added from specifying correctly what type of interaction 
may be present. Our results also warn the applied researcher against using a common 
econometric specification of interaction effects where the reference group mean is simply 
included as an additional regressor. Finally, our results also imply the benefits of trying to 
identify the correct type of interaction. 
Additional Reading 
Acemoglu, D. and A. Wolitzky (2011), “The Economics of Labor Coercion,” Econometrica, 79, 
555-600. 
Akerlof, G. and R. E. Kranton (2008), “Identity, Supervision, and Work Groups,” American 
Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 98, 212-217. 
Besley, T. and M. Ghatak (2008), “Status Incentives,” American Economic Review, Papers and 
Proceedings, 98, 206-211. 
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3. Social Interactions in Commodity and Derived Labor Demands 
Social interactions are of much policy relevance because they can alter the effects of 
taxation or transfer programs intended to improve the economic situation of the poor or 
unemployed (Grodner and Kniesner 2006, 2008a). If there are significant interactions then 
optimal policy need consider the synergies described by so-called social multiplier effects.  
Where workers care about their positions in the income distribution then a beneficial regulatory 
policy that does not alter relative incomes receives too low a benefit in conventional cost-benefit 
calculations. Thus, ignoring social interactions can mis-state significantly the social welfare 
effects of taxes, transfers, or regulatory policy. 
Our contribution in Grodner and Kniesner (2008a) is an increased understanding of the 
role of social interactions is to flesh out succinctly the demand implications of two basic forms of 
interactions: spillover (externality from other consumers' behavior) and conformity (penalty for 
people behaving different from the norm), where social interactions are directly embedded into 
the utility function via social utility. Our results succinctly clarify (1) how a positive spillover 
generally increases product demand (and the associated derived demand for labor), (2) how 
conformity pivots product demand around the expected market demand to make consumers less 
price responsive (and the associated derived demand for labor also less elastic), and (3) how 
social interactions in one good indirectly influence other goods’ demands and the associated 
derived demand for labor.  
3.1 Organizing Model 
We begin with the total utility function (Brock and Durlauf 2001) 
      , ; , , , ; ,x xV x y V u x y S x         (3.1) 
st. x yp x p y M          
(3.2) 
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  where x  and y  are actions/choices made by an individual with the corresponding prices 
xp  and yp , and  ,u x y  is the private utility associated with a choice bundle  ,x y . Here x  is 
the conditional probability measure of choices that a person places on the choices of others in the 
reference group,  ; ,xS x    is social utility from the choice of the individual and his or her 
expectation of the choices of others,   is the parameter indicating the importance of social 
utility in total utility, and M  is total resources.
1
 Finally, we also assume a positive sign for 
0uV  , and that SV  has an uncertain sign depending on the form of interactions. 
We consider two forms of social interactions: positive spillover and conformity. Positive 
spillover implies 0SV   (from social capital, neighborhood/peer, contagion, or conspicuous 
consumption effects). Conformity is associated with a negative contribution to utility because 
there is a disutility for being different, 0SV   (from class identity, social norm, relative income, 
or reference utility effects). Negative spillover can happen too via 0SV  , or non-conformity by 
taking 0SV  . 
Because spillover is an externality relative to reference group behavior, forms like 
 1 ; ,s x xS x x   ,  
2 2; ,s x xS x x   , and  
3 ; ,s x xS x x    are examples of a 
spillover effect, where 
xxS  affects the slope of demand differently. The first spillover example 
above describes social capital or neighborhood effects. The second describes mathematically 
peer effects or contagion/herding. The third equation above represents conspicuous consumption 
or rat race spillover effects. 
Conformity is a fundamental building block in social psychology. The idea is that 
individuals tend to conform to broadly defined social norms, with a magnitude depending on the 
cohesiveness, group size, and social support. One can model conformity as 
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 ; , 1/c x xS x x     where someone is rewarded for behaving according to the norm. The 
form of social utility in cS  is difficult to work with analytically, and we need at least a 
restriction that 
xx  . Without loss of generality, we consider conformity a quadratic loss of 
utility such as    
21
2
; ,c x xS x x
      ,    
42
12
; ,c x xS x x
      , or one such as
   
2
3 2 2
4
; ,c x xS x x
      . The first representation of conformity captures social norm 
effects. The second is how reference income or utility effects look algebraically. The third type 
of conformity example above reflects threshold effects or demand maxima. Again, depending on 
the form of conformity via Sxx the effect of interactions on the demands for x  and y  may differ 
non-trivially.  
3.2 Demand for the Good with Interactions, x 
Interactions here are via the expectation of the demand for good x  by a particular 
consumer, 
x . In an ideal setting or small community an agent may observe others’ demands for 
x  and make sensible inferences concerning expected demand via the sample mean, median, or 
mode. In cases where the market is large the individual finds it harder to infer others' behavior 
and may resort to using existing norms. 
To clarify the effect of interactions now we consider an exogenous change in 
x  and take 
the total differential of  ; ,xS x   , which is 
xxx x x x
dS S dx S d S d            
(3.3) 
The difference between the non-interactions case and any case with interdependence is through 
xxS , xxS  , and xS  . 
The effects of variables influencing demand here are 
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 
 
income effect partsubstitution effect part
2
2 2 2
2
change in price : (3.4 )
2
change in magnitude of interactions : (3.4 )
det
ch
y y u xy x u yy
x x y u xy x u yy y u xx y S xx
y S x
p x p V u p V udx
a
dp p p V u p V u p V u p V S
p V Sdx
b
d H



  

   

2
ange in average market demand : (3.4 )
det
xy S x
x
p V Sdx
c
d H



 
where the matrix H  is the Hessian, and the determinant of H  is  
 2 2 2det 2 0.x y u xy x u yy y u xx y S xxH p p V u p V u p V u p V S          (3.5) 
If the function  u   is concave and  V   is without interactions, the concavity of  u  
guarantees det 0H  . However, with interactions present we still need to determine the sign of 
2
y S xxp V S  to decompose the effect of price on demand for x  into income and substitution effects. 
Note that both components from the Slutsky equation are affected because interactions enter the 
denominator through  xxSy SVp2 ; it is true for all further cases below. 
Figure 3.1 shows how exogenous positive spillover affects the demand for good x . All 
forms of spillover cause demand to increase because , 0
xx x
S S   . As a consequence, the 
associated derived demand for labor also increases. However, the functional form for social 
interactions has a profound effect on how exactly demand shifts. For 1sS  (social capital) the shift 
is parallel, for 2sS  (contagion) the effect is larger for higher levels of x , and for 3sS  
(conspicuous consumption) the effect is smaller for higher levels of x . Not only the level of shift 
differs but also the slope changes non-trivially. Because 
1 0,sxxS   
2 0,sxxS   
3 0sxxS   the first 
demand curve has the same slope as the no interactions case, the second demand curve is the 
same shape but has steeper slope, and the third demand curve has a different shape than the no-
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interactions case. The effect of an increase in average demand, 
x , is qualitatively the same as a 
change importance of social interactions,  . 
Although qualitatively all spillover effects have the same impact on demand, quantitative 
implications are dramatically different. Each new demand curve has a different elasticity, and 
potential policy implications can vary greatly. For example, when a researcher needs to calculate 
deadweight loss of fiscal policy such as taxation, the results differ for various demand curves. 
For spillover 1 the deadweight loss is the same as for the no interactions case. For spillover 2, the 
deadweight loss would be higher, and for spillover 3 the deadweight loss would lower than the 
baseline case of no interactions. 
The effect of conformity in the utility function is summarized by Figure 3.2. For all forms 
of interactions the demand curve pivots around the point where 
xx   because at that level of x  
we have 0xS   . Although demand pivots around the average demand, x , the slope of the new 
demand can be (1) uniformly flatter ( 1cS ), (2) become flatter as x  changes ( 2cS ), or (3) the 
slope can change from flatter to steeper ( 3cS ). The effect of increase in average demand, h , is 
also not uniform though all demand curves increase. 
The intuition for conformity is that because there is a penalty for being different from the 
norm, there is a natural tendency for consumers to behave similarly. Therefore, the product 
demand curve is less elastic, and via Marshall’s Fourth Rule so is the associated derived demand 
for labor less elastic. However, non-linearity of the conformity effect creates break-even points 
where consumers change behavior from being less responsive to the change in price to more 
sensitive to price changes. Some of the behavior resembles the Loss Aversion hypothesis. 
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The analysis not only stresses the need for modeling non-linear social interactions, but 
also underlines the fact that modeling interdependence by the theoretical setup in (3.1) and (3.2) 
is flexible and accommodates many realistic cases. 
3.3 Demand for the Good without Interactions, y  
We also analyze how interactions present in good x  affect second good that does not 
have interactions, y . Comparative statics results are the derivatives: 
  
 
income effect partsubstitution effect part
2
2 2 2
change in price : (3.6 )
2
change in magnitude of interactions :
x x u xy y u xx y S xx
y x y u xy x u yy y u xx y S xx
x y
p y p V u p V u p V Sdy
a
dp p p V u p V u p V u p V S
p pdy
d


    

   

 (3.6 )
det
change in average market demand : (3.6 )
det
x
S x
x y S x
h
V S
b
H
p p V Sdy
c
d H





 
Interactions affect every derivative through the denominator but interdependence also 
influences the income effect through  y S xxp V S . Because the budget constraint binds, any 
change in good x  due to a change in the price of good y  changes income for good y . 
With a positive spillover effect in good x  the demand for good y  declines for all forms 
of spillover. An increase in average demand increases demand for y , even though the change 
differs by form of spillover. The slope can only be established for 1sS  (social capital) as it is the 
same as the baseline case and demand declines uniformly (because 
1 0sxxS    the slope for x  did 
not change either). The other cases of spillover for which 0xxS   have uncertain change in the 
slope because  2y S xxp V S  in (3,6a) has both flattening and steepening effects. 
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In the case of conformity, it is unclear what happens to the demand for y  because 
xxS  
affects both the nominator and denominator of (3.6a). Even if we focus on the simplest case, 1cS , 
x xS x   , and / / detx y S xdy d p p V S H   is uncertain a priori. Conditional on the level of 
x , for individuals with 
hx   the demand for y  is higher.
3
 For 
hx   the demand for y  is 
lower because more x  is consumed, / 0dx d  . We still cannot determine how demand for y  
changes on the entire range of x  because there is no reference point like 
x  in demand for the 
non-interactions good, y . 
A graphical illustration can help. Think of an extreme case where demand for x  becomes 
perfectly inelastic due to conformity, then demand for y  becomes /x yM p , where 
x x xM M p    and x  represents a constant demand for x . Depending on whether x  and y  
are complements or substitutes the change to the demand for y differs. 
The effect of interactions in good x  on the demand for good y  appears in Figure 3.2. If 
without social interactions goods x  and y  are substitutes , / 0ydx dp  , extreme conformity in 
x  makes demand for good y  is less elastic. With the presence of the substitute the demand for 
y  was more elastic because consumers demand more of x  to substitute because of the higher 
price of y . When the demand for x  is fixed consumers cannot substitute y  with x . 
If without interdependence goods x  and y  are complements, / 0ydx dp  , and the 
demand for good y  with extreme conformity in x  becomes more elastic relative to the case of 
no interactions. When there were no social interactions in x , both x  and y  were relatively 
tightly connected by being complements. When x  is fixed and a certain part of income is spent 
on good y , the demand for y  becomes more elastic. 
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Thus, how interactions in good x  affect demand for good y  and the demand for labor 
producing good y depends on the relationship between the two goods. In some cases we can 
make an inference, but the analysis becomes more involved, and the results may be less useful 
and intuitive. Nevertheless, we show how interactions in only one good affect the behavior of 
other goods as long as the goods are in the same consumer expenditure bundle. 
3.4 Summary 
In general, a positive spillover effect increases product and labor demand, and specific 
functional forms for social utility make the slope of demand change non-trivially. Demand can 
become more elastic over certain ranges of prices but less elastic over another ranges of prices. 
The magnitude of interactions is important because in some cases part of the population (say, 
low-demand consumers) may be more strongly affected by the interactions than the rest of 
consumers. With conformity, product demand pivots around the expected market demand, and 
product (and labor) demand becomes less elastic. A specific functional form can exaggerate or 
diminish the general changes to product demand and the associated demand for labor producing 
the good with attendant changes in the policy implications of, say a minimum wage, compared to 
the no-interactions case. 
We also show that interactions in one good indirectly affect the demand for a good that 
has no direct interactions. The inter-good effect hinges on whether the two goods are 
complements or substitutes. We cannot analytically provide answers concerning how the non-
interactions good (and associated demand for labor) is affected by an interactions type good 
without some prior knowledge of the relationship between the two commodities. 
We acknowledge that there are other forms of interactions potentially represented by the 
social utility term  S   besides spillover and conformity; the analytical representations may 
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vary, and interactions may operate through different channels such as via the budget constraint. 
However, we believe that spillover and conformity exhaust most of the real-life interactions 
problems and the examples demonstrate the flexibility of our model setup. Our results are useful 
for policy changes and welfare analysis. The qualitative effects on demand are relatively clear; 
the quantitative outcomes may have profound consequences on the correct measurement of the 
deadweight loss, behavioral effects of taxation, minimum wages, or jobs creation programs as 
the derived demand for labor mimics the product demand differences due to social interactions. 
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4. General Equilibrium and Welfare with Interdependent Preferences 
The traditional trade-off discussed in economics is between equity and efficiency. The 
market may help best allocate resources but also generates inequality of incomes. The notion of 
equity-efficiency trade-off implicitly assumes that higher equality of incomes improves welfare. 
The government may in turn seek to affect total income inequality through lowering wealth 
inequality (as opposed to reducing earnings inequality), because it does not directly affect 
incentives to invest in human capital. Here we provide another argument why one needs to be 
careful in providing greater wealth equality when there are social interactions present. We do not 
claim that the situation here is the most general case but instead simply show that under 
asymmetric positive (altruism) or negative (envy) social interactions there are cases where some 
wealth inequality can be consistent with higher social welfare (Grodner and Kniesner 2008c). 
The non-optimality of exactly equal incomes has been shown in the context of different 
risk aversion (Pestieau et al. 2002), uncertain incomes (Kreider 2003), and subjective levels of 
welfare (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2001). Further, in certain circumstances identical households 
may not necessarily be treated equally at the social welfare optimum (Mirrlees 1972, White 
1981). The intuition behind the unequal treatment result is that there may be different resource 
costs of making various households equally well off. We extend the literature on evaluation of 
economic inequality by introducing social interactions, which have been shown to affect social 
welfare (Bernheim and Stark 1988, Kooreman and Schoonbeek 2004) and provide explanation 
for a greater concentration of wealth than labor earnings (De Nardi 2004). 
We model heterogeneous agents in terms of wage distribution and introduce asymmetric 
social interactions where only one individual is either altruistic or envious. For simplicity, we use 
a quasi-linear utility function and assume an economy with two workers and two goods (leisure 
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and consumption). The results suggest that when workers have different wages it is optimal to 
redistribute wealth from high-wage workers to low-wage workers. In the case where workers 
have the same wages but one individual is social, the optimal wealth distribution suggests taking 
wealth away from the individual who derives more utility from wealth when given the same 
resources (with negative social interactions -- from the non-social individual; with positive social 
interactions -- from the social individual). However, when low-wage individuals are altruistic or 
high-wage individuals are envious, there are cases where it may be welfare-improving to 
increase wealth inequality by redistributing wealth from low-wage (low-earnings) individuals to 
high-wage (high-earnings) individuals. Once again we are not arguing that government policy to 
increase wealth inequality in general social welfare improving but rather use the situation to 
demonstrate how one must reason through policy affecting social welfare when social 
interactions are present. 
4.1 Organizing Model 
We begin with a two-worker, two-good economy where each worker has the same 
individual preferences for consumption and leisure. Heterogeneity of agents comes in via 
differences in wages. Social interactions are introduced to only one individual's preferences 
similarly to the approach in Brock and Durlauf (2001), where in addition to his or her individual 
utility the worker has a social portion in total utility. Social utility represents the fact that one 
cares for the other person's leisure. The simple setup allows for group distinctions such as selfish 
young vs. altruistic old or envious rich vs. altruistic poor. 
Our approach from Grodner and Kniesner (2008b) is different from the standard general 
equilibrium framework where the social planner maximizes social welfare by choosing particular 
combinations of consumption and leisure for each individual, and where wealth is treated as an 
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exogenous endowment. In the following setup the social planner redistributes total wealth  Y   
between two workers to maximize social welfare (W) subject to the population wealth constraint, 
where each worker individually maximizes utility subject to the individual budget constraint. 
The approach has been used in Moreno-Tenero and Roemer (2006). 
Formally, the model can be represented as 
     
1 2
1 1 1 2 2 2 2
,
1 2
max , ; , ; , , ;
st.       population wealth constraint,
Y Y
W W V c l S l V c l
Y Y Y
      
 
 
(4.1) 
(4.2) 
where subscripts index the worker, c  is consumption of the generic good, l  is leisure,   
indicates the utility-maximizing choice for each individual of consumption and leisure, Y  is 
wealth, S  is social utility (which represents social interactions), V  stands for total individual 
utility, W is the social welfare function (SWF), and β, δ are parameters. The social planner 
chooses a combination of wealth (Y1, Y2) that maximizes social welfare (4.1) subject to the 
individual maximization conditions and the population wealth constraint (4.2). 
The social maximization condition requires that the social welfare function (SWF) 
marginal rate of substitution equals minus the slope of the utility possibility frontier 
1 2 1 2
/ / ,V VW W dV dV   (4.3) 
where 
1V
W  and 
2V
W  represent marginal social utilities with respect to individual utilities. Because 
the distribution is done with respect to wealth, there is no clear relation of the ratio in (4.3) to a 
particular wealth distribution. Therefore we want to restate the condition in wealth space as 
1 2 1 2
/ / 1Y YW W dY dY    (4.4) 
 

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because the budget constraint is a straight line with the slope of negative one. By representing 
the SWF as an indirect social welfare function in w  and ,Y  and considering that condition (4.3) 
must be satisfied for the solution of the optimization problem (4.4) given (w1, w2, β, δ), we have 
     
1 2 1
1 1 1 2 2 2 2 21
1 2 2
, , ,
/ 1.V V V
V w Y V w Y S w YV
W W W
Y Y S Y
       
    
      
   
 
 
(4.5) 
where  1 2,Y Y   is the wealth distribution at the social optimum. Notice that due to social 
interactions the marginal utility of wealth for the second individual is altered by  
 
1
2 21
2
,
V
S w YV
W
S Y

 
 because the leisure of the second worker affects the first worker's utility. 
Suppose there are no social interactions, then 
 
1
2 21
2
,
0V
S w YV
W
S Y


 
. For the social 
optimum to be at an equal wealth distribution, that is 1 2Y Y
  , either wages have to be the same 
 1 2w w , or there is no income effect due to a change in wages   / 0i idY dw  . Both 
assumptions are special cases so that wage heterogeneity should generally result in an unequal 
optimal distribution of wealth. 
By the same token, when there are social interactions but wages are equal  1 2w w , the 
optimum in (4.5) holds only when 
 2 2
2
,
0
S w Y
Y



. The effect of income on social utility is zero 
only when the second worker's demand for leisure is not affected by income   2 2/dl dY , which 
again is a (very) special case. 
So, in general, both wage dispersion and social interactions should produce unequal 
wealth distribution at the social optimum. Only when the effects exactly counteract each other is 
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there a possibility of an equal wealth distribution, which we again note needs to be regarded as a 
special case. 
4.2 An Example of Asymmetric Social Interactions 
We now demonstrate the implications of the model in a case with additive, equal weights 
in the Social Welfare Function and quasi-linear underlying individual utility functions. Here the 
social utility enters into preferences of one individual additively. Our choice of the utilitarian 
SWF is to make individuals be treated equally by the social planner and prefer equal distribution 
of utility (not wealth). Our choice of additive social interactions ensures that the model does not 
overemphasize the effect of interdependence on individual demands. The simple setup 
maximizes tractability of the model while maintaining the avenue for social interactions. 
We define asymmetric interactions as when only one individual responds to the behavior 
of the other individual, such as in 
1 1 1 2
2 2 2 ,
c l l
c l
u c l l
u c l
  
 
  
 
 
(4.6) 
(4.7) 
Where once again c is consumption of the generic good, l is leisure, T is total available time, w is 
the wage rate (price of consumption is 1 and is taken as the numeraire), Y  is a non-labor income, 
and  
lc  , , l  are parameters.
12
 Note that   represents labor supply and  is total 
earnings. The utility function in (4.6) and (4.7) has the property that even though it is quasi-
                                               
12. We use wealth and non-labor income as equivalent although in practice wealth is a sum of 
non-labor incomes discounted by the interest rate. For the purposes of tractability in 
presentation we ignore the distinction. 
 
 T l  w T l
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linear, the utility possibility frontier is still convex. Finally, each individual faces a similar 
budget constraint 
, 1,2i i i i ic wl wT Y i     (4.8) 
where i  indexes the individual ( 1,2i  ). 
The parameter 
l  represents the effect of social interactions.
13
 When 0l   we can think 
about the altruistic behavior of the first individual with respect to the second individual (a spouse 
cares for the partner's leisure or parents care for leisure of their offspring), but when 0l   we 
can think about envious behavior (in the family setting, siblings compete over how much 
attention they are given by their parents because attention translates into higher levels of quality 
for leisure time). 
The demands for both individuals are the same: 
      
(4.9) 
(4.10) 
where   2 21/ 1 /
ic l c i
P w    and    2 21/ 1 /il i c i lP w w   . 
However, the indirect utility functions become 
     
1 1 21 1 1 1 2c c l l l l
V wT Y P P wT Y P        and 
(4.11) 
 
                                               
13. A more general model would have j being individual-specific or good-specific. In that 
framework we would choose particular parameters so that ji  0, where j represents a good and 
i  indexes an individual. Discussing interactions in only one good and in one other individual is 
sufficient to draw conclusions that reflect more general models. 
 
 
  ,
i
i
i i i c
i i i l
c wT Y P
l wT Y P
 
 
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 
2 22 2 2
( ).c c l lV w T Y P P     
(4.12) 
The problem for the benevolent planner is to maximize the social welfare function 
subject to the population wealth constraint defined by wealth limits  1 2Y Y Y   and requirement 
for individuals to maximize their utility (4.11 and 4.12). The optimal allocation of wealth now 
becomes 
    
    
2 2
1 2 1
2 2
2 1 2
/ 1
/ 1
Y Y w T P wT P
Y P Y wT w T P
   
   
 
(4.13) 
(4.14) 
where     
2 2 1 1
/c c l l l c c l lP P P P P        .  
4.3 Simulation Experiments 
Similar to DeNardi (2004), who draws meaningful conclusions when examining the 
evolution of wealth in a model with bequests through simulation experiments, we discuss 
implications of our model by setting particular parameter values and performing numerical 
calculations. In what follows we do not prove that wealth inequality is generally desired, or find 
conditions for such a situation, or even try to match the U.S. economy’s distributions of wealth, 
earnings, or total income. The goal of our research is to provide cases demonstrating the basic 
result that when social interactions are present it may be beneficial to redistribute wealth away 
from low-income individuals, even when it makes them poorer by any objective measure. 
Because we only attempt to prove the existence of this somewhat counter-intuitive result, it is 
enough to demonstrate several plausible cases. 
Using the calibration presented in Grodner and Kniesner (2006) we choose βc = 0.0492, 
βl  = 0.0466, and δ = 0,01 (altruistic individual) or 0.01 (envious person). Wages range from 
0.65 to 0.90 and the total wealth to be distributed equals 1466. In the discussion below we label 
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workers as [1] or [2] where the square brackets distinguish the labels for workers from those of 
equation numbers. Each table fixes the characteristics for worker [2] and changes either the wage 
or intensity of social interactions for worker [1], which are presented in the far left column. The 
numbers inside the tables are ratios of incomes or utilities for worker [1] versus worker [2]. 
Income stands for total income and equals wealth plus earnings, which are measured by wage 
times hours worked. For comparison, the results on the left in each table are for an equal 
distribution of wealth, and results on the right represent optimal distributions of wealth, which 
maximize social welfare. 
4.3.1 Wage Heterogeneity 
Starting at equality, as the wage for individual [1] increases the social planner needs to 
take away wealth from the high-wage worker [1] and distribute it to the low-wage worker [2]. It 
can be seen in equations (4.13) and (4.14), when we set P = 1 (no social interactions). The 
intuition is that the marginal utility of wealth for the low-wage worker [2] is higher than the 
marginal utility of wealth for the high-wage worker [1]. It is then beneficial to transfer wealth to 
the person whose utility experiences the greater gain due to the transfer. However, there is still 
equality of total income because the high-wage individual [1] makes up for lower levels of 
wealth by having higher earnings. The result recasts the long-standing equity-efficiency tradeoff 
whereby an increase in the inequality of wealth or income creates less inefficiency in the 
ultimate utility (efficient) outcome. 
4.3.2 Social Interactions 
Now consider social interactions when wages are initially equal. The optimal distribution 
of wealth has the altruistic (δ > 0 and P > 1) individual [1] receiving less wealth. The result can 
be seen in equation (4.11) where the social individual [1] derives positive utility from wealth of 
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the non-social individual [2] and needs to make up for the difference with higher earnings. 
Again, the social planner needs to transfer wealth to the non-social individual [2] for whom the 
marginal utility of wealth is higher to increase total welfare. However, notice that in all cases the 
social individual has more utility and by objectives measures it is hard to tell who is better off.  
The results can also be seen from studying equations (4.13) and (4.14). When there are no 
social interactions, 1P  and the solution is symmetric. When the social individual is altruistic 
0 , we have  1P  , and thus 12 P  . Then there are two effects why the non-social 
individual needs to have more wealth: 12 YY    because (i) in the outcome equation for 2Y , 
YYP 2 , which is a pure wealth effect, and because (ii)     22 101 PwTPwT  , which is 
an earnings effect. When the social individual is envious 0 , and we have 1P  and 12 P . 
Then there are two effects why the non-social individual needs to have less wealth: 21 YY    
because (i) in the outcome equation for 2Y , YYP 
2
, which is a pure wealth effect, and because 
(ii)   012 PwT , which is an earnings effect. We can also see it as a make up for a lower 
marginal utility of earnings of the social individual, which needs to be compensated with wealth, 
because in the outcome equation for 1Y  we have   01 2  PwT . The earnings distribution is 
primarily determined by wages because even with social interactions the demands for 
consumption and leisure are the same (4.9 and 4.10). 
4.3.3 Wage Heterogeneity Plus Social Interactions 
So far the individual from whom it was beneficial to transfer away wealth is no worse off 
either by having equal total income (in the case of wage heterogeneity) or by having higher 
earnings (in the case of social interactions). Now we turn to the case where an individual can be 
worse off in both objective measures, and yet be better off in terms of welfare. 
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Table 4.1 presents the case of an altruistic individual [1] who has low wages (below 
0.8702, which is the wage for the high-wage worker [2]). Notice that for wages below 0.75 the 
low-wage worker [1] has more wealth because the wage heterogeneity effect (transfer wealth to 
[1]) dominates the social interactions effect (transfer wealth from [1]). However, in the range of 
wages 0.77–0.8702 the low-wage, altruistic worker [1] has both lower wealth and lower earnings 
but yet higher utility. Table 4.2 likewise demonstrates a similar case with a high-wage, non-
social worker having more wealth and earnings and yet lower utility. 
4.3.4 Summary 
For the purposes of demonstrating how policy exercises change when there are social 
interactions we have demonstrated a case where in the presence of a small amount of wage 
inequality it may be welfare improving to transfer wealth away from altruistic, low-wage 
workers towards non-social high-wage workers. By objective measures of economic equality 
(wealth, earnings) one individual is worse off, and yet that worker is better off in terms of utility 
level. The intuition is that with social interactions the efficiency-equity tradeoff no longer 
determines the effect of transfers on well-being. Our simulations underscore the importance of 
incorporating social interactions when studying the policies affecting the distributions of wealth 
and earnings. 
4.4 Wealth Distribution Policy Implications 
We have presented a model with two heterogeneous individuals deriving utility from 
consumption and leisure where one of them receives utility from the other's leisure (asymmetric 
interactions). The presence of a high level of wage dispersion suggests a higher wealth inequality 
and also higher earnings inequality at the social optimum, so that both distributions have 
compensating effects that result in equality of total income. When there is interdependence, 
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inequality of wealth may not be undesirable because it reduces inequality of utility. When there 
is both wage inequality and utility interdependence then there is a possibility of wealth equality 
as well as any form of wealth inequality -- it depends on the inter-play of the wage heterogeneity 
and social interactions effects. 
The results of our numerical simulations demonstrate that under limited wage inequality 
it may be beneficial for society to transfer wealth away from altruistic, low-wage workers. The 
economically regressive transfer is social welfare improving even though by the objective 
measures of economic well-being (wealth or earnings) the low-wage individual has less 
resources, while the other individual is worse off in terms of utility. This underlines the 
importance of considering social interactions when studying the policies affecting distribution of 
income. 
We do not argue that the results of our simulations imply that wealth inequality is always 
beneficial for a society with unequal wages and social interactions. Rather, we point out the 
possibility of wealth and income inequalities that maximize social welfare because social 
interactions in utility can potentially mitigate the adverse effects of economic inequality. In some 
circumstances optimal inequality creates an outcome that is desirable from a social welfare 
perspective because it reduces inequality of utility. In the presence of social interactions the 
redistribution should be from high-utility individuals to low-utility individuals. A just society 
may be willing to perform such a redistribution and also regard it as fair. For any sensible policy, 
though, it will be critical to identify correctly the high-utility individuals, who may either be 
social or non-social, and that will be a formidable task. 
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5. Empirical Welfare Analysis: Social Interactions and Poverty Spell Length 
Our research in the following section examines how individual and community factors 
influence the average length of poverty spells, which are the number of months with income 
below a U.S. federal government poverty income threshold. We measure local economic 
conditions by the county unemployment rate and neighborhood spillover effects by the racial 
makeup and poverty rate of the county. We find that moving an individual from one standard 
deviation above the mean poverty rate to one standard deviation below the mean poverty rate 
(from the inner city to the suburbs) lowers the average poverty spell by 20–25 percent; this is 
equal in magnitude to the effect of changing the household head from female to male. Finally, 
we find that when we control for the demographic, human capital, and county level effects the 
conditional effect for high school graduates is only two months (85 percent smaller than the 
unconditional effect), black poverty spells are about eight months (half of the unconditional 
effect), and female headed households increase length of spells by about eight months (80 
percent of the unconditional effect). 
5.1 Overview 
Although the U.S. has experienced an unprecedented GDP growth over the past 50 years, 
there still has been a double-digit poverty rate partially due to an uneven distribution of 
prosperity (Hoynes, Page, and Stevens 2006, Danziger and Danziger 2006). Part of the problem 
includes neighborhood specific factors that increasingly play a prominent role in both economic 
research in general (Brock and Durlauf 2000, Manski 2000) and in poverty research in particular 
(Small and Stark, Luchter, Qian, and Crowley, Hannon in the Special Issue on "Income, Poverty, 
and Opportunity," (2005) Social Science Quarterly 86(s1)). There is strong evidence that 
individual outcomes are related to local crime rates (Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman 1996), 
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educational segregation and peers (Clapp and Ross 2004), human capital spillover in local labor 
markets (Glaeser 2000), or racial composition of neighborhoods (Quillian 2003). One of the 
classic examples is the follow-up study to the Gautreaux experiment, which provides strong 
evidence for possible link between better neighborhood quality characteristics and higher family 
incomes (Keels et al 2005). Given the importance of neighborhood effects and their strong 
relevance for the study of individual poverty, we have used unique individual data matched with 
county level statistics to study the effects of county level unemployment, racial composition, and 
poverty rates on the length of time individuals spend being poor. 
In our research we ask how individual and community factors influence the average 
length of poverty spells (Grodner, Bishop, and Kniesner 2010). We use the term community 
factors to describe two distinct phenomena: local economic conditions and social interactions. 
The concern over local economic conditions is easily motivated: is the persistence of poverty 
greater in counties with high rates of unemployment? To introduce the notion of social 
interactions we follow Durlauf (2003) who argues that individuals are influenced by 
neighborhood spillover effects. For example, persons in counties with chronically high poverty 
rates may suffer greater poverty persistence even when controlling for local economic conditions 
because of peer pressure or norms. Similarly, counties with high proportions of minority 
residents may have lower levels of social capital and hence longer spells of poverty.  
We address four potential explanations for the behavior of individuals in poverty. 
Demographic characteristics are expressed by race, gender, and marital status. Human capital 
explanations are captured by the education and age of the household head. Local market 
conditions are represented by the level of unemployment in a county. Finally, social interaction 
effects are captured by the percent black and percent poor in a county. To study the 
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demographic, human capital and county level effects on the average poverty spell length we use 
a matched PSID/Census sample.  
The data we discuss here cover 1968–1989 and include annual poverty spells (greater 
than 12 months). The average poverty spell is nearly 39 months. The average black poverty spell 
length is 16 months longer than the average white poverty spell. The average female headed 
household poverty spell is 9.3 months longer than that of male headed households. High school 
graduate households suffer 12 fewer months of poverty than dropout households. However, 
when we control for the demographic, human capital, and county level effects we find that the 
relative high school graduate poverty spell falls by 85 percent (2 months), the black poverty spell 
falls by half (7.8 months), and the female headed household’s poverty spell falls by 20 percent 
(7.7 months). Consistent with a life cycle explanation, we find that for both races the poverty 
spell length first falls in childhood, rises in adulthood, and then falls again after retirement. By 
using separate equations for whites and blacks we find important differences in the factors (other 
than age) that influence poverty spells across races.  
We consider the effect of a county’s unemployment rate, poverty rate and racial makeup 
on the length of a poverty spell too. Of the three area factors, the percentage of poor in a county 
has the largest effect. Moving an individual from one standard deviation below the mean poverty 
rate to one standard deviation above the mean poverty rate (from the inner city to the suburbs) 
may lower the average poverty spell length by 20 to 25 percent. The area poverty rate effect just 
mentioned is equal in magnitude to changing the household head from female to male.  
The results of our research to follow are mainly descriptive, and we do not claim to have 
identified causality between all the independent variables and the poverty measures. However, 
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the effects of the demographic, human capital, county level characteristics are sensible, and both 
statistically and economically significant. 
5.2 Some Background Literature 
Stephen Jenkins (2000) in his Presidential Address to the European Society for 
Population Economics observes that much more is known about long-run trends in poverty than 
about the short-run dynamics of poverty (p.530). For example, a large body of research identifies 
the demographic and human capital characteristics of the poor (Danziger and Haveman, 2001). 
The literature on poverty persistence is not nearly as large. 
The seminal paper investigating the dynamics of poverty using spell duration and exit 
probabilities is Bane and Ellwood (1986). Using 12 years of data (1970–1982) from the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) Bane and Ellwood find that most persons who become poor 
have only a short stay in poverty. At any given time the majority of the people who are poor are 
in the midst of a long spell of poverty, though. 
More recently, Stevens (1999) advances the study of poverty dynamics by estimating the 
time spent in poverty over multiple spells. Like Bane and Ellwood, she finds substantial 
persistence among the stock of poor individuals. In contrast to Bane and Ellwood, she finds 
substantial persistence among the persons who flow into poverty. Stevens notes that single spell 
analyses find that most people will be poor for less than two years (Gottschalk et al., 1994); her 
multiple spell analysis highlights that the average time in poverty over a decade is four years. 
Jenkins noted that much of the poverty dynamics literature (following Bane and Ellwood) 
focuses on consecutive observations within a given state or poverty spell. He further noted a 
need to study the “longitudinal patterns of poverty experience” (p.535). The original contribution 
to the study of poverty patterns is the well-known Years of Poverty, Years of Plenty (Duncan et 
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al., 1984). A more thorough review of the empirical literature concerning poverty transitions 
appears in McKernan and Ratcliffe (2005). 
The effects of the neighborhood characteristics on the situation of the poor also have 
gained considerable attention. Specifically, Quillian (2003) uses the PSID to provide evidence 
that blacks stay longer in poor neighborhoods, and Keels et al. (2005) report success of poor 
black households who were relocated to more affluent suburban neighborhoods from downtown 
Chicago as a result of the Gautreaux residential mobility program. 
5.3 Methods and Data 
The contribution of our research is in the inclusion of the local market and social 
interaction effects. To study the characteristics that describe the length of a poverty spell we 
choose a linear regression approach. The strategy has an advantage of a simple interpretation and 
easy introduction of non-linearity. Our model is 
 Poverty spell length (months) = f (D, H, C),    (5.1) 
where D is demographic characteristics including race and gender, H includes human capital 
factors such as the household head’s education and age as well as the individual's age (cubic), 
and C includes county level variables such as percent unemployed, percent black, and county 
poverty rate, all of which are quadratic (Grodner, Bishop, and Kniesner 2010). 
The approach of using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is a major simplification that 
ignores spell dependence, non-normal distribution of the error term, spell censoring, and non-
linearity of the spell length. It is well documented that the conditional probability of exiting 
poverty during a particular year, given the number of years a person has been poor, a hazard rate, 
is non-negligible (Bane and Ellwood 1986, Stevens 1999). The violation of the assumed ex ante 
distribution on the error term complicates informative inference on the distributional shape of 
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outcomes. The censoring can create a significant bias to the estimates for the same reasons that 
the bias is present in all limited dependent variable models. Because of spell dependence the 
relationship between independent variables and the duration is always non-linear, with the 
simplest possibility being the log duration model. 
Equation (5.1) could potentially be estimated by duration model methods. However, the 
disadvantages of the typical duration model are the often strong parametric assumptions on the 
hazard rate and a non-trivial computation of the marginal effects on the length of the spell. In 
some models it may be difficult to obtain standard errors for the marginal effects. Moreover, the 
solutions to the left censoring may have a large effect on the predicted spell length because of the 
usually assumed extreme value distribution on the error term (it may predict overly long spell 
lengths, which in turn distorts the predicted mean duration). In general, the marginal effects of 
independent variables on the spell length in duration models may vary greatly between various 
specifications, which is mainly due to the fact that the duration model is not designed to compute 
marginal effects in the first place and one need do multiple transformations to calculate them. 
We believe that the benefits of using simple linear regression outweigh the disadvantages 
in our application. Multivariate regression overcomes the difficulty of computing the marginal 
effects because they come directly from the parameter values in OLS. We can easily capture 
non-linearity in the relationship between spell length and independent variables by including 
both polynomial and interactions terms. Depending on the level of censoring it is possible that if 
the bias to OLS is small, the estimates may actually be more robust and close to the true values 
than marginal effects computed from different specifications of the duration models. In contrast 
to the duration models, consistency of the OLS does not require assumption of any particular 
distribution on the errors as long as the expected value of the innovations is zero. Still, the 
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standard errors may be incorrect in OLS, but we may induce more bias by computing non-linear 
functions of the standard errors for marginal effects from potentially mis-specified parametric 
duration models. 
Another issue is the potential self-selection of poor individuals into the counties with 
high percentage poor. It may be particularly important if persons who, on average, have short 
spells of poverty locate themselves in counties with small numbers of poor persons. We may 
then observe a positive relationship between poverty rate and the length of the poverty spell but 
not due to a casual effect, but rather due to self-selection. Because the PSID follows individuals 
we have records of their movements between counties, and we can partially mitigate the effect of 
self-selection by controlling with dummy variables for movers. We did not attempt a Heckman's 
self-selection model because we could not determine variables that affect selection of individuals 
into the high poverty counties but do not also affect poverty spell length (an exclusion 
restriction), and because the movers are relatively a small part of the sample, just over 15%. 
(Self-selection should affect in similar ways OLS and duration model estimates, however, the 
problem is easier to solve in OLS because of the well-established set of econometric techniques 
in light of the information in the data.) 
A linear regression with multiple non-linear terms may then be better suited for our 
purpose of estimating the marginal effects. Obviously, estimating the true duration model is the 
appropriate method for poverty spell length modeling and computing marginal effects. It is 
possible that a mis-specified duration model is more severely biased than the OLS. In any event, 
we present competing duration method results and argue that they are inferior to our OLS 
estimates. 
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5.3.1 Data Sources 
Our primary data source is the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for 1968–1989 
(Stevens 1999). We study only persons who were poor at least once during the sample period. 
Following Stevens, we take a broadened definition of poverty as having a family income that is 
below 125 percent of the U.S. federal government’s official poverty line income for the structure 
family in question. We ignore all individuals who have never been poor assuming that they are 
very different from people who have ever been poor. 
In addition to the rich selection of individual and family characteristics, we use 
information about county location for each person. We matched county level data (poverty rates, 
racial makeup) from the 1970, 1980, and 1990 Censuses. The data points for years in between 
censuses were obtained by imputing information by the closest census data and then adjusting 
the weighted average to the national mean as reported by the Statistical Abstract of the United 
States. 
Annual county level unemployment rates are available from 1975 onward. The years for 
which unemployment data were not available include information from the closest year 
available. All weighted averages were corrected to match the annual mean as reported in the 
Statistical Abstract of the United States. 
All county-level variables for each spell are for the beginning of the spell. We may be 
ignoring potentially useful within-spell information about changes in the county characteristics. 
At the same time, any measure of the central tendency (mean, median, mode) will be affected by 
the mobility decisions of persons who change counties, and so will not be exogenous to the 
length of the poverty spell. A potential regressor candidate would be the difference in the value 
of each county's characteristic in the first and the last period of the poverty spell. Again, we 
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would have to separate trends in county characteristics from the national trends (say, take into 
account the increase in the poverty during the 1970s). We believe that using the first period's 
characteristics gives us a good way to benchmark each individual's county characteristics, 
especially because we can condition the estimated effects by using a full set of year dummy 
variables. 
5.3.2 Summary Statistics  
We focus on the distinction between individuals in poverty, spells of poverty, and years 
in poverty (per individual or per spell). The idea can be most easily demonstrated by the 
following schematic: 
              TOT 
Year 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 13 
Poor=1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 7 
Person <-----------  years in sample  ----------- > 1 
Spell   <---- spell ---->    <- spell ->  2 
Spell-year   <> <> <> <>    <> <> <>  7 
 
During the 13 years shown in the above example, there are two spells of poverty, one of 
three poverty years, and one of four poverty years, for a total of seven poverty years. The 
average number of years per spell for a particular person is 3.5 years. Previous studies of poverty 
dynamics studies do not make a distinction between single and multiple poverty spells by the 
same person. Duration studies usually focus on individual spells only and do not examine the 
particular pattern of poverty transitions (the exception is Stevens 1999). 
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The importance of identifying the patterns of poverty can be illustrated by the following 
example. Suppose two individuals are in the sample during all 13 years and each is poor during 
seven of the years. The first person is poor during the first seven years, ends his poverty period, 
and stays non-poor for the rest of the time frame. In contrast, suppose the second person 
alternates between states of poverty and non-poverty during the same time frame. Clearly, 
policies designed to aid the first person who suffers prolonged periods of poverty may not be 
effective in helping the second person who suffers multiple, but short periods of poverty. 
Table 5.1 provides some summary statistics used in our examination of the length of 
poverty spells. Our sample contains 27,020 poverty spells with an average spell length of about 
39 months. About 54 percent of the people have a single poverty spell. We consider three types 
of variables, individual characteristics, head of household characteristics, and county 
characteristics. The individuals in our sample of poverty spells have an average age of 23 years, 
are nearly two-thirds black (64 percent), and slightly more likely to be female (54 percent). The 
household heads are 42 percent unmarried females, 52 percent married, and about seven percent 
unmarried males. Only slightly more than one-third of the household heads are high school 
graduates. More than 70 percent of the household heads are between 25 and 60 years of age. The 
typical county of residence by a poor individual has an unemployment rate of about 6 percent, is 
nearly one-quarter black, and has a poverty rate of over 16 percent. 
Table 5.1 also provides summary statistics for average poverty spell length. Blacks on 
average are poor for about 44 months and whites for 29 months. Persons in female-headed 
households have poverty spells that are 9 months longer on average than persons living in male-
headed households. Persons living in households where the head is a high school dropout suffer 
an additional 13 months of poverty. 
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5.4 Empirical Results 
We divide our discussion based on Grodner, Bishop, and Kniesner (2010) into three 
sections. First, we note basic demographic influences on poverty spell length. Then we consider 
the effect of an individuals’ age on poverty spell length. Finally, we examine the effect of county 
characteristics on average poverty spell length. We also provide estimates using alternative data 
sample selection criteria in order to gauge the sensitivity of our county level results.  
5.4.1 Demographic Indicators  
Table 5.1 also lists regression coefficients for the demographic indicator variables. The 
dependent variable is the number of months an individual spends in poverty. In addition to race 
we consider the relative effects of the household head’s gender (female-head), education (high 
school), and the age (agehead_0-25 and agehead_60), as well as the gender of the individual 
(female). All regressions include state and year dummies plus indicator variables for persons 
who changed counties during poverty spell (movers). We include variables for the individual's 
own age and the county-level effects but report them in separate sections. 
Each regression also contains dummy variables for left-censored and right-censored 
spells, which is equivalent to running a model with only uncensored spells, but is more efficient 
because it uses all observations. There is a possible bias in our estimates because the censoring 
dummies are an aspect of the dependent variable. However, because we have about the same 
number of left and right-censored spells we believe that the opposite effects of the censored spell 
dummy variables mostly cancel out. We later show that by using our simple regression results 
we have both significant gains in predictive power and the implied marginal effects are more 
stable than in traditional duration models (Table 5.2). In other words, we acknowledge that by 
design our model and the use of the dummies for censored spells can create a bias, but because 
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the purpose of our project is to predict the conditional poverty spell length, the OLS is our 
preferred model by virtue of being the most robust and stable estimation technique.
14
  
The first column of Table 5.1 reports the demographic coefficients without the county 
level effects in the regression. Comparing the coefficients in column one with the coefficients 
with the county level effects (column 2) shows little difference in the coefficient values across 
model specifications. This allows us to concentrate on the regression results that include the 
county level effects.  
Table 5.1, column 2 also reveals that being black, female, or living in a female headed 
household increase poverty spell length while living with a head with a high school education or 
who is than less than 25 years old reduces the average spell length. All of the above coefficients 
are significant at the one percent level. Furthermore, we find that living in a married household 
(relative to the omitted group, single male head) or living with a head greater than 60 years old 
(relative to a head between ages 25 and 59) does not significantly affect the length of the poverty 
spell.  
Examining the magnitude of the effects of demographic indicator variables on poverty 
spell length, we find that blacks’ suffer about eight more months of poverty than the typical 
individual in a white-headed household. Individuals living in female-headed households also 
suffer poverty spells that are about eight months longer than the omitted group’s, unmarried male 
heads. Living in a family with a high-school educated head reduces poverty spells by 
approximately two months. Persons living with heads less than 26 years old have poverty spells 
                                               
14. When using the PSID data too Stevens (1999) found that ignoring right-censored spells in a 
duration model did not affect any signs and statistical significance of the regression coefficients. 
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that are about five months shorter than those living with older heads. Individual female poverty 
spells are 1–2 months longer than male poverty spells.  
It is useful to compare the predicted poverty spells from Table 5.1 with the observed 
poverty spells also noted in Table 5.1. The black/white observed gap is just under 16 months 
(44.46  28.70); however, the predicted gap is only about eight months. Thus, controlling for 
other factors reduces the black/white gap in half. For female heads the observed gap is just over 
nine months and the conditional gap is under eight months. Only about 20 percent of the female 
head’s gap is explained by differences in the covariates. In contrast, high-school dropouts have 
an observed gap of almost 13 months while the conditional gap is under two months. Almost all 
(85 percent) of the gap between high school graduates and dropouts can be explained differences 
in the controlling factors.  
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5.1 present the regression results by race. It is quickly apparent 
that race matters so to speak. The difference between the races is most obvious for female heads 
and heads less than 26 years old. Individuals in black, female-headed households suffer over nine 
more months of poverty while individuals in white, female-headed households suffer only four 
more months of poverty. Living with a young head shortens the average black poverty spell by 
more than six months while living with a young head shortens poverty spells for whites by only 
under three months.  
5.4.2 Individual’s Age  
We model an individual’s age and the length of the poverty spell as a cubic function. 
Interpreting the meaning of a cubic function from a table is burdensome; we use simple plots 
together with 95 percent confidence bands to explore the relationship between age and poverty 
spell length.  
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Figures 5.1a and 5.1b present the conditional predicted poverty spell length by age for 
white versus black individuals. Figure 5.1a is the white age effect. The cubic function appears to 
fit the data quite well; poverty spell length declines as white children age and then begins to rise 
during adulthood. White individuals near retirement age have poverty spells of approximately 
the same length as small children. After retirement age white poverty spell length declines 
continuously.  
We present the black age effect in Figure 5.1b. Unlike other demographic indicators such 
as female-head we find little difference in the age effect between races. We conclude that for 
both races poverty spell length falls in childhood, rises in adulthood and falls again after 
retirement, which seems to reflect reasonably the expected life cycle.  
5.4.3 County Level Effects  
Our primary interest is in investigating the relationship between poverty spell length and 
county level neighborhood effects. By modeling the poverty spell length as a function of a 
county’s unemployment rate we can examine the impact of local market conditions on spell 
length. To capture the impact of social interactions we model poverty spell length as a function 
of the county’s racial makeup (percent black). Further, we consider the effect of the percent poor 
in a county on the average poverty spell length, which we suspect contains elements of both local 
market conditions and social interactions. We present our results by race.  
Figures 5.2a and 5.2b provide a useful picture of the influence of county poverty on the 
length of an individual’s poverty spell. The county’s percent poor has a positive and linear 
relationship with the poverty spell length for both whites and blacks. Not only do county 
characteristics appear to relate to the spell length of the poor non-linearly, but blacks and whites 
also differ in the type and intensity of the association.  
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At this point it is useful to ask what is the (relative) magnitude of the county level effects. 
One benchmark is comparing the effect of a head with a high school degree. In Table 5.1 we see 
that not having a high school degree adds approximately two months to a poverty spell in the 
both races sample. The percent unemployed for whites and the percent poor for blacks are the 
county level effects with the greatest magnitudes. Using our point estimates, more fully 
presented in Grodner, Bishop, and Kniesner (2010), we find that an increase in the county 
unemployment rate from 4.0 to 6.5 percent is associated with a two-month increase in poverty 
spells for whites. An increase in the percentage poor in a county from 10 to 13 percent is 
associated with a two-month increase in poverty spells for blacks. 
We have just seen that relatively modest changes in the county level indicators have non-
negligible level of association with the average length of the poverty spell. Suppose for the 
purpose of discussion that the effect is causal and we consider the change in the percent poor in a 
county from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean 
(mean = 16.5, standard deviation = 7.9). If we move a white individual from a county that is 24 
percent poor to one that is eight percent poor the average poverty spell falls by 20 percent (about 
six months). The same change for black individuals may result in an 11-month decrease (25 
percent). In both cases the effect is greater than that of a female head on the average poverty 
spell. A similar experiment for whites and unemployment results in a four-month decease in 
poverty, again similar in magnitude to the white female-head effect.  
How realistic is this assumption of moving individuals from a county with a poverty rate 
of 24 percent to a county of eight percent? Consider the following examples of neighboring 
localities (Census estimates): District of Columbia (17 percent) and Fairfax County, VA (five 
percent); City of Richmond (20 percent) and Chesterfield County (six percent); Orleans Parish 
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(New Orleans, 27 percent) and St. Tammany Parish (Slidell, 11 percent); and rural Northampton 
County, NC (22 percent) and Wake County (Raleigh, eight percent). This implies that moving 
from one standard deviation above the mean poverty rate to one standard deviation below the 
poverty rate is equivalent to moving people from either the inner city to the suburbs or from the 
countryside to the city.  
5.4.4 Sensitivity Checks  
Finally, we confront here the possible issues of misspecification of OLS by running 
censored regression (censored from the right for spells still in progress) to control for censoring, 
censored regression on log of poverty months to control for a non-normal error term, and a more 
general Weibull model with and without right censoring to investigate the effect of a flexible 
functional form. A duration model assuming a Gamma distribution on the hazard rate did not 
converge, and we did not estimate proportional hazard models due to difficulty with obtaining 
marginal effects. We also ignored left censoring, unobserved heterogeneity, and multiple spells, 
which are relatively complicated issues. 
Table 5.2 presents the results of our further robustness checks. The first column presents 
the OLS results from the full dataset with all people (as in Table 5.1). Controlling for right 
censoring (second column) does not change the signs or magnitudes of the estimated effects, and 
most coefficients are within two standard deviations of the OLS results. Using a dependent 
variable that is the log of poverty periods has little impact on our estimates as well. However, the 
use of a parametric Weibull model affects the coefficients substantially. For example, at the 
mean duration level, the length of the poverty spell for blacks is 17 months, which is more than 
twice the size of the effect from the OLS. Again, censoring marginally affects the coefficients.  
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We note that in most cases the results of the OLS (first column) lie between the results 
from both the log duration model and Weibull model. OLS also fares relatively well as measured 
by the median of MSE. Even though we acknowledge that a properly selected and estimated 
duration model is more appropriate for modeling a poverty spell length than a simple OLS, we 
believe than an arbitrarily selected duration model may cause more harm than good for our 
purpose of modeling the conditional effects. 
5.5 Summary 
W have asked how individual and community factors influence the average length of 
poverty spells. We use the term community factors to describe two distinct phenomena: local 
economic conditions, and neighborhood spillover effects. We measure local economic conditions 
using the county’s unemployment rate. We measure neighborhood spillover effects using the 
racial makeup and poverty rate of the county.  
Our matched PSID/Census sample covers the period 1968 to 1989 and includes all 
poverty spells greater than 12 months. The average poverty spell is nearly 39 months. The 
average black poverty spell length is 16 months longer than the average white poverty spell. The 
average female-headed household poverty spell is nine months longer that of male headed 
households. High School graduate households suffer 12 fewer months of poverty than dropout 
households. However, when we control for the demographic, human capital, and county level 
effects we find that the relative high school graduate poverty spell falls by 85 percent (two 
months), black poverty spells are halved (eight months), and female headed households poverty 
spells fall by only about 20 percent (eight months).  
Consistent with a life-cycle explanation, we find that for both races the poverty spell 
length falls in childhood, rises in adulthood and falls again after retirement. Using separate 
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equations for whites and blacks we find important differences in the factors (other than age) that 
influence poverty spells across races. Individuals in black, female-headed households suffer an 
additional nine months of poverty, while individuals in white, female-headed households suffer 
only four additional months of poverty. Living with a young head shortens the average black 
poverty spell by more than six months while living with a young head shortens poverty spells for 
whites by only about three months.  
We consider the effect of a county’s unemployment rate, poverty rate and racial makeup 
on the length of a poverty spell. Of the three factors, the percentage of poor in a county has the 
largest effect. Taken as a causal effect, moving an individual from one standard deviation above 
the mean poverty rate to one standard below the mean poverty rate (from the inner city to the 
suburbs) lowers the average poverty spell by 20–25 percent, which is equal to the effect of 
changing the household head from female to male. 
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6. Labor Supply Social Interactions: Estimates and Tax Policy Implications 
 Social interactions, the situation where individuals respond to the actions of people with 
whom they identify, may have a biological basis or stem from information gathering. Social 
interactions are a potentially important aspect of labor supply behavior; interdependencies can 
affect how people react to the expected and unexpected changes in their environment, including 
ones caused by public policy. We investigate the econometric nuances and empirical importance 
of social interactions in labor supply with taxes where the interdependence is a response of the 
individual to the hours worked by members of a reference group. We find evidence of a positive 
spillover effect in hours worked and demonstrate their quantitative importance for tax policy 
(Grodner and Kniesner 2008c). 
 The presence of social interactions in labor supply means that individuals respond to 
others’ hours worked by a non-negligible amount. A social interactions effect can be important 
because policy affecting the wages or another independent variable of a subgroup will not only 
affect the individual but also others in the individual’s reference group. We therefore focus on 
the consequences of interdependence for the estimated effect of wages on labor supply, which 
economists use widely in examining tax reform proposals. Our research contribution is to 
implement a tractable labor supply model with spillover effects and then demonstrate the value 
of econometric estimates of social interactions in labor supply for tax policy. 
Theoretical solutions to optimal static or dynamic taxation in the presence of social 
interactions externalities use the parameters of the utility and attendant consumption and labor 
supply functions (Kooreman and Schoonbeek 2004, Abel 2005). To flesh out briefly the enriched 
policy implications of a labor supply model with social interactions let us consider a basic 
proportional tax reduction applied to married men in a case with potential social interactions 
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effects. Suppose the proportional tax rate change applied only to families with disabled children. 
The subpopulation affected would be relatively small and scattered geographically; reference 
group effects could be ignored safely. Alternatively, suppose we were examining the effect of a 
proportional state income tax change on the highest earners in a state such as California, where 
many would live in the same area or interact regularly in professional settings. Now feedback 
effects would be present. The labor supply elasticity to consider would then include non-
negligible social interactions effects. Put simply, the benefits of empirical social interactions 
research are that after identifying any interdependencies the economist can perform a more 
complete welfare analysis. 
 Identification of social interactions is econometrically complex (Soetevent 2006, Lee 
2007a, b). The primary challenge a researcher must confront is what is the correct reference 
group (Durlauf  2004). There is a wide-ranging belief that people in close proximity can have a 
significant effect on the individual's labor supply decisions (Weinberg et al. 2004). Similarly, 
there is labor supply research where reference points come from others who are demographically 
similar but need not live near each other (Woittiez and Kapteyn 1998). Here we synthesize the 
two possibilities. We explore an econometric model that allows the data to reveal reference 
groups that are multidimensional in demographic and geographic closeness with the weights left 
as free parameters to be estimated. 
 In summary, we address many of the practical issues related to identifying the effect of 
endogenous social interactions on an individual's actions. We create a flexible measure of the 
economic distance approximating the level at which individuals interact among one another. We 
define the economic distance between individuals as a combination of personal characteristics 
and physical distance. Our measure reflects the varying costs of interaction as higher economic 
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distance implies higher cost of interaction, which implies a lower level of interaction. We then 
define the reference groups, each of which consists of persons who are in a close economic 
proximity, and compute hours worked for each person in the reference group (endogenous social 
interactions). We create and verify the econometric validity of using the mean of hours worked 
for persons in the adjacent reference group for the purpose of instrumenting endogenous social 
interactions. The specification lets us examine the core issue of whether the hours supplied by 
persons in close economic proximity are related. 
 To frame the importance of social interactions we purposely use cross-section data from 
1976 to anchor our research to the seminal and oft cited cross-section studies of male labor 
supply by Hausman (1981) and MaCurdy et al. (1990). Our econometric results suggest positive 
and non-negligible social interactions in hours worked. Our focal results are that U.S. male labor 
supply data (1) reject a model ignoring social interactions against one with spillovers and (2) 
reject a model with spillovers treated as exogenous against one with spillovers treated as 
endogenous. A regression model that ignores spillovers in labor supply underestimates the wage 
elasticity of labor supply by about 40 percent; if one uses a social interactions model but ignores 
the endogenous interactions component one underestimates the wage elasticity by over 60 
percent. We conclude with a demonstration of how improperly accounting for social interactions 
can lead to substantial under or over estimation of the labor supply effects of tax reform. 
6.1 Conceptual Framework and Econometric Model 
 Theories of social interactions have a fairly long history in the economic literature. 
Becker (1974) fleshes out the consequences of when utility of the individual is somehow affected 
by either utility or choices made by members of a reference group, who are people with whom 
the individual interacts or identifies. More recent theoretical research delves into the details of 
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how information and species survival considerations may be the source of equilibrium social 
interactions in utility (Samuelson 2004; Rayo and Becker 2007a,b) and what differentiates 
situations where individuals emulate versus deviate from peer behavior (Clark and Oswald 1998, 
Grodner and Kniesner 2006). 
 The utility function that leads to our labor supply estimating equation is the utility 
function derived by Hausman (1980, 1981) amended to include social interactions, which yields 
a linear labor supply function that is linear in the means of the reference group behavior. This 
anchors our results to Hausman’s and MaCurdy’s influential research, which facilitates judging 
the economic importance of adding social interactions to labor supply. In the empirical work to 
follow we regress individuals’ hours worked on average hours worked in their reference groups, 
ceteris paribus. A positive coefficient on average labor supplied by the reference group indicates 
the presence of a positive spillover effect in hours worked (Woittiez and Kapteyn 1998, 
Aronsson et al. 1999).  
When implementing econometrically the spillover model of individual labor supply we 
estimate the familiar linear in means model that is the canonical linear labor supply model with 
social interactions added (Brock and Durlauf 2001, 2002, and Grodner and Kniesner 2006). 
Specifically, for individual i in reference group g  
      1 ( ) 2 ( )i i i i i g i g ih x h x              ,       (6.1) 
where  is the after-tax real wage,  is after-tax virtual income, x is a vector of individual control 
covariates, ( )i gh   is reference group g’s average labor supplied excluding the i
th
 worker, ( )i gx   is 
the vector of control covariate averages for the reference group excluding the i
th
 worker,   is the 
error term, and [, , , , , 1, 2] are parameters to estimate. From equation (6.1), an increase 
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in average hours worked in the reference group spills over so that the individual also increases 
hours worked. 
We now flesh out the econometric details involved with examining possible exogenous 
and endogenous social interactions in individual labor supply and suggest an approach that 
synthesizes two avenues in the literature. The econometrically inclined reader will immediately 
see the connection between social interactions issues and spatial econometrics (LeSage and Pace 
2009). 
6.2 Labor Supply Variables 
 The net wage rate ( ) uses a marginal tax rate   provided by the PSID, and is 
(1 )w   . Virtual income ( ) also uses the marginal tax rate from the PSID.15 To control for 
possible endogeneity when estimating (6.1) we instrument both the after tax wage and virtual 
income using the previous year's gross wage and non-labor income (Ziliak and Kniesner 1999). 
 The control covariates in labor supply include number of children less than six years old, 
family size, an indicator if the person is more than 45 years old, the equity the family has in their 
house, and an indicator of a physical or nervous condition that limits the amount of work, which 
are standard exogenous explanatory variables in labor supply studies. Finally, in some 
specifications x includes hours worked in the previous year (h1) to allow for the possibility 
noted by Rayo and Becker (2007a,b) that the reference point in utility may depend not only on 
reference group outcomes but also on the individual’s habits. 
                                               
15.   = [NLI + ( – (TT/(TI – NLI))  (TI – NLI))], where NLI is non-labor income, TT are 
total taxes, and TI is taxable income (Ziliak and Kniesner 1999). For a survey of income tax 
effects on labor supply, including over the life cycle, see Kniesner and Ziliak (2008).   
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6.3 Social Interactions Variables 
 The mean labor supplied by the reference group is the sample average of hours worked 
for other people who are economically close to the worker. In computing the average we exclude 
the individual for whom we are computing a reference group mean outcome. The estimated 
value of the parameter 
1  represents the effect of endogenous social interactions in hours 
worked. 
 Next, we create a proxy variable summarizing the information in the exogenous 
covariates. Specifically, we use factor analysis and take the first factor as a proxy variable for 
exogenous information. The new variable is standardized to have zero mean and unit variance, 
and is highly correlated here with all the exogenous variables as well as the individual’s hours 
worked. The mean in the reference group for the created (factor analytic) proxy variable uses the 
same range of the economic distance variables as we use for computing mean hours worked, 
again excluding the person for whom we are computing the reference group mean. The proxy 
variable controls for the common characteristics of the reference group, and the estimated 
coefficient 
2  will indicate any presence of exogenous social interactions. 
6.4 Identifying Labor Supply Social Interactions 
The labor supply equation in (6.1) can identify the presence of both endogenous (in the 
dependent variable) and exogenous (in the independent variables) social interactions. If the 
reference groups are completely separable then a randomly distributed shock that affects hours 
worked for some individuals and not others can help identify endogenous social interactions 
(Manski 1993, Moffitt 2001). When reference groups overlap there are a variety of empirical 
approaches including repeated samples (Aronsson et al. 1999), structural models (Brock and 
Durlauf 2002, Kapteyn et al. 1997, Krauth 2006), aggregated data (Glaeser et al. 2002), within 
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versus between variation (Graham and Hahn 2005), or spatial econometric techniques (Kelejian 
and Prucha 1998, Lee 2007a,b, LeSage and Pace 2009). 
Alternatively, suppose there are workers who belong to more than one reference group, 
and we use them to compute the (endogenous) mean for reference group hours worked. Hours 
worked by people in the adjacent reference group can now be an instrument; this is similar to 
using past values of the dependent variable in a dynamic panel data model (Arellano and Bond 
1991). Here we use as an instrument the mean for workers in the adjacent reference groups, 
which are defined by a social grid with two social coordinates from factor analysis. The 
instrument is correlated with mean hours worked in the individual’s reference group 
(endogenous social interactions) because people in the specific reference group and the adjacent 
reference group belong to the same economic neighborhood. The instrument should also be 
uncorrelated with unobservables affecting individual labor supply because the particular 
individual does not belong to the adjacent reference group.
16
 In any event, the IV approach that 
we use will be checked in the usual ways for weak instruments and that the overidentifying 
restrictions are satisfied, and if the checks are passed then we are no less comfortable with our 
approach than with any other IV application. 
Figure 6.1 illustrates our particular identification strategy. We present the hypothetical 
two-dimensional social coordinate space with two reference groups: 
1g  and 2g . Suppose that 
individual 
0
1g
h  belongs to the reference group 
1g  and responds to the outcomes of the members 
                                               
16. Similarly, Case and Katz (1992) instrument for the endogenous effect using the average 
levels of adjacent neighbors’ characteristics that are supposedly exogenous, and Evans et al. 
(1992) instrument school composition with city-wide variables for the unemployment rate. 
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of the reference group, represented by the observations labeled as 
1
1g
h  and 2
1 2g g
h  (empty and 
shaded circles). If we use the mean of all 
1
1g
h  and 2
1 2g g
h  observations (referred further as  0
1g
h  ) as 
an independent variable in the regression (6.1) to try to identify endogenous social interaction in 
0
1g
h  the coefficient will be biased. Observations 1
1g
h  and 2
1 2g g
h  are also affected by outcome 0
1
,gh
which causes endogeneity in the  0
1g
h  . However, if there are observations in the reference group 
1g  that also belong to the neighboring reference group 2g , then part of 
 0
1g
h   attributed to the 
outcomes 
2
1 2g g
h  can be instrumented by the outcomes of the members of the reference group 
2g , 
denoted by 
3
2g
h . If the usual diagnostic checks are passed plus an additional one developed in 
Lee (2007b) that reference group size varies, then we can reasonably use instrumental variables 
(IV) estimation. The 
3
2g
h  are valid instruments because they are correlated with all 
2
1 2g g
h  
observations since they belong to the same reference group, and 
3
2g
h  are not correlated with the 
error terms associated with either 
0
1g
h  or 
1
1g
h  observations since they do not belong to the same 
reference group.
17
 
                                               
17. In practice, if we instrument observations 
2
1 2g g
h  with outcomes 
3
2g
h  there may still be 
observations 
1
1g
h  that are not instrumented and thus will make a part of the  0
1g
h   endogenous, 
which is the case presented in Figure 6.1. Instead of using just one reference group we can 
imagine using a full set of observations in the adjacent reference groups that form the ring 
around the particular reference group (represented by the dotted circle). 
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6.5 Data 
We use data from the University of Michigan's Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 
collected in years 1975 and 1976 (PSID Wave IX). One reason for using the PSID is that it is the 
most frequently used data to study U.S. labor supply (Blundell and MaCurdy 1999, Ziliak and 
Kniesner 1999). We purposely chose the 1976 cross-section of the PSID data because we seek to 
understand the possible importance of social interactions in labor supply by anchoring our 
estimates to the influential research of Hausman (1980, 1981) and MaCurdy et al. (1990) who 
use the same data to examine how taxes affect labor supply without modeling social interactions. 
6.5.1 Sample 
We follow the sample selection process described in Eklöf and Sacklén (2000) who 
compare the studies by Hausman (1981) and MaCurdy et al. (1990) to which we anchor our 
research. Both studies estimate an almost identical linear labor supply model with income 
taxation. We select observations according to the following criteria: married males 26–55 years 
old with positive hours worked in 1974 and 1975 (but no higher than 5096 annual hours) who are 
heads of households in the cross-sectional random sub-sample; there were no changes in the 
family composition of the head or wife (others can change) in years 1974–1975; the head is not 
retired, permanently disabled, housewife, student, or other; the household resides in the United 
States; and the head is not self-employed or a farmer. Using our exclusion criteria for the 1976 
PSID we obtain 1077 observations, which is close to the Hausman sample of 1084 and the 
MaCurdy sample of 1018 as reported by Eklöf and Sacklén (2000).
18
 
                                               
18. The difference between the number of observations used by MaCurdy et al. (1990) and our 
study comes from the fact that we dropped two observations because the head’s age was 
missing and that we did not exclude persons who were self-employed and farmers in 1975 but 
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6.5.2 Individual Regression Variables 
The wage rate comes from a direct question in the PSID, including an imputed value for 
workers who are not paid by the hour. We also estimate a wage equation to impute hourly wages 
for observations with unobserved or truncated wages. In particular, we use observations that 
have positive and not top-coded wage rates (839 observations) to estimate a Tobit regression that 
uses as the dependent variable observed (un)truncated wages on a constant term, age, age 
squared, years of schooling, years of schooling squared, college degree, and family size. We then 
use the estimated wage equation to produce a fitted value for all wages. The procedure is similar 
to that in Hausman (1981), and so our mean hourly wage is $6.17, which nearly identical to the 
$6.18 reported by Hausman. 
Hours worked, the dependent variable, also comes from a directly asked question in the 
PSID. Non-labor income is a constructed variable that is the difference between total 1975 
taxable income of the husband and wife and total 1975 labor earnings of the husband. The hours 
worked and the non-labor income measures we use are also those of MaCurdy et al. (1990). 
Other independent variables include number of children less than six years old (KIDSU6), family 
size (FAMSIZ), an indicator variable for individuals more than 45 years old (AGE45), the 
amount of equity the family had in its house (HOUSEQ), and an indicator of a physical or 
nervous condition that limited the amount of work the respondent could do (BHLTH). 
                                                                                                                                                       
not in 1976 (changed employment status). Due to restricting the sample to individuals who also 
reported hours worked for year 1974, we have a final sample of 910 men. 
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6.5.3 Reference Group and Economic Distance 
Specifying the composition of the individual's reference group is the researcher’s central 
decision in any study of interdependence (Manski 1993, 2000). Implementing the reference 
group concept means acknowledging that people who are in relative economic proximity to each 
other may interact with one another because the cost of interactions is low. We use the concept 
of economic distance among individuals as an indicator of the potential significance and 
magnitude of workers’ interdependencies (Conley 1999). We take people who are in close 
economic distance as belonging to the same reference group. 
Economic distance is a combination of whether the workers are similar demographically 
and live in close physical proximity. We use a combination of personal and family characteristics 
to define demographically similar persons and use the distance between centers of counties in 
which people reside for their relative geographic locations. 
There are multiple difficulties involved with selecting from a large variety of 
characteristics to measure economic distance. Acknowledging that each characteristic measure 
has a difference scale, and determining the relative importance of each input variable on 
economic distance, we use a statistical model of factor analysis (Woittiez and Kapteyn 1998). 
The factor analytic model deals naturally with characteristics having different measurement 
scales; the procedure standardizes individual variables then fits a linear model to find common 
latent variables called factors (Bai and Ng 2002, Bai 2003). The intuition is that there are 
unobservable variables (factors) that are orthogonal to one another and that are strongly 
correlated with observed variables. We use the factors as social coordinates to establish reference 
groups. 
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 Because the typical variables explaining labor supply can affect whether workers interact 
with each other by being related to economic distance, our factor analysis inputs all independent 
variables from the econometric labor supply model (6.1). We also use physical coordinates 
indicating the location by the center of the county where the person resides. We use two factors 
to summarize demographic and physical coordinates because there is usually a much better fit 
with multiple factors than with only one factor, but using too many factors tends to be 
uninformative.
19
 By using two factors we have the convenient feature that the computed latent 
variables serve as two social coordinates (SocCoord1, SocCoord2) for where individuals are 
located on a social interactions grid with economic distance measured by Euclidean distance 
between two points. 
6.6 Econometric Results: Labor Supply with Social Interactions 
 Because in our study there is no clearly defined reference group, we first select persons 
likely to have interdependent labor supplies by using the two social coordinates to define 
overlapping neighborhoods. The reference group now defined, we then estimate the labor supply 
model in (6.1) using instrumental variables for identification. If the appropriate econometric 
specification checks are satisfied, we then interpret the social interactions effects in terms of 
endogenous versus exogenous wage effects. 
                                               
19. The first factor loads primarily on demographics and explains about 75 percent of the total 
variation in the variables. The second (rotated) factor loads primarily on location and then 
explains about 15 percent of the information. 
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6.6.1 Selecting the Reference Group 
 Because we do not have direct information on who belongs to the reference group for a 
particular person we use a statistical procedure to infer it from the location and characteristics of 
the group’s members. We believe that our observations are representative for working married 
men in terms of their individual characteristics and spatial distribution. 
 We can think of the reference group as a ring of certain radius centered around the 
individual in two-dimensional social coordinate space (Figure 6.1). The problem is then to select 
the radius best representing the borders of the reference group. The borders selection problem is 
key because we use sample observations to compute the characteristics of close-by individuals. 
Each observation establishes possible multiple reference groups so that careful selection of 
borders is critical here for identification. 
 To find borders for the membership groups we use a result from spatial econometrics that 
as the reference group size expands the coefficient on endogenous social interactions tends to 
minus infinity (Kelejian and Prucha 2002).
20
 In our application endogenous social interactions 
are represented by the mean of hours worked by others in the worker's reference group, 
AnnHSRG_0_R, where R indicates the radius dimension of the reference group’s circle. If social 
interactions are present at a certain size of the reference group, then the upward bias because of 
reference group labor supply endogeneity will overcome the statistical tendency for 1̂  in (6.1) to 
become negative as the neighborhood size increases (Anselin 2001). The reference group with 
                                               
20. The intuition behind the result is that as the size of the group used to produce the average 
grows it approaches a similar value for everyone and become increasingly collinear with the 
regression constant term.  
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the most positive 
1̂  in exploratory estimates of (6.1) then reveals the size of the worker’s 
reference group.  
 Grodner and Kniesner (2008c) presents results from baseline labor supply regressions 
with a social interactions variable, AnnHSRG_0_R. Estimation starts with radius indicator R = 1, 
which means that the average of hours worked uses nearby workers in the social space within the 
distance of 0.1 or less. When the indicator R = 1 the reference group has around 13 workers. As 
the size of the reference group increases in the social space (the radius indicator R increases), the 
number of persons who are considered to be economically close to a worker increases from 44 to 
about 271. 
 As expected a priori, the coefficient on average hours worked by neighboring persons is 
increasingly negative, going from about 0.2 to 1.5 as the reference group size increases. Such 
a tendency will be observed for any estimator, including the IV regressions (Kelejian and Prucha, 
2002). Critical to our research is that the reference group labor supply coefficient is most 
significantly positive at the size of the reference group where radius indicator R = 2. 
The pattern of background regressions in Grodner and Kniesner (2008c) reveals the 
group size with the largest upward bias due to endogeneity of the AnnHSRG variable. The 
endogeneity caused by labor supply interdependencies is most positive for the range (0,0.2), so 
we pick 0.2 as the radius most closely capturing the true size of the reference group. Results 
from a Moran I test (Anselin 2001, p. 323) support the presence of social interactions in hours 
worked; the radius we adopt to define the reference group based on our preliminary regressions 
also maximizes the Moran I statistic measure of association. The practical consequence of our 
specification search is that the average reference group contains about 44 persons, which 
indicates to us that groups are small enough to guarantee sufficient outcome variation across 
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groups but large enough so that the computed average hours worked are meaningful and have 
relatively small error due to aggregation. Our results also satisfy the identification condition for 
general spatial econometric models established in Lee (2007b) that groups vary in size (standard 
deviation is 38 and maximum size is 139).
21
 
6.6.2 Estimated Social interactions Effects 
 The focus of our research is on examining interdependence in hours worked using the 
canonical model of labor supply applied to cross-section data. This anchors our results for 
purposes of interpretation to the influential labor supply research of Hausman (1980, 1981) and 
MaCurdy et al. (1990). 
 We first confirm that our estimates for the uncompensated wage and income elasticities 
are similar to the results of Hausman and MaCurdy et al. The first column of Table 6.1 presents 
IV regression wage and income coefficients for the canonical model of labor supply. The 
uncompensated wage elasticity at the means is 0.14, and the income elasticity at the means is 
0.008; both values are typical estimates in the male cross-section labor supply literature that 
serves as our starting point for judging the importance of social interactions. 
 Our focal regression results are presented in the second column of Table 6.1, where we 
include both habits and social interactions. We also use as a regressor the average of the proxy 
                                               
21. As yet another check on the reasonableness of how our econometric model reveals groups, 
we examined the intragroup correlation of the members’ characteristics variables and the 
correlation of the same variables in an identical sized group selected randomly. In all cases the 
model’s groupings had much higher intragroup correlations (typically greater than +0.90) versus 
among the members of randomized groups of similar size (typically less than +0.02). 
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variable for the exogenous variables constructed via factor analysis (IndVORG_2_6). The 
estimated social interactions effect is that a 10 hours increase in the reference group labor 
supplied would increase individual's hours worked by about 6 hours. Comparing columns two 
and three of Table 6.1 yields the important result that the estimated social interaction effect is 
significant statistically and economically reasonable in magnitude only when habits in labor 
supply are part of the specification.
22
 
 It is important to re-emphasize that the estimated endogenous social interactions effect, 
1̂ , which is the impact of average hours worked by persons in the worker's reference group 
(AnnHSRG_0_2), has the expected sign and economically reasonable magnitude only after the 
we instrument for interdependence, which we do in Table 6.1 (the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 
rejects exogeneity at the 5 percent level). Because the econometric issues in social 
interactions/spatial economics models are still unfamiliar to many readers the method we use to 
construct the instrument for social interactions in labor supply bears re-emphasis. 
                                               
22. The coefficient on the hours worked for the reference group needs to be less than 1.0 
otherwise a one hour increase in the mean hours worked for the reference group would induce a 
worker to increase his labor supply by more than one hour, which would cause a domino effect 
where, in the limit, all workers choose the maximum feasible hours. The coefficient of the 
lagged dependent variable in both columns (2) and (3) is 0.59 with a standard error of 0.03. In a 
cross-section regression it will reflect both habits and additional worker-specific heterogeneity. 
One needs an IV panel data estimator to incorporate both two effects into the model properly, 
which is an interesting topic for future research. 
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 As noted, there are no obvious variables to provide exogenous variation with which to 
instrument reference group work effort, so we use the structure of the data to construct an 
instrument for the reference group’s labor supplied. Taking reference groups as overlapping with 
boundaries as fixed, average hours worked by persons in the adjacent two-dimensional reference 
groups can be instruments. The outer boundary of the persons for the instrument group will be 
exactly twice the size of the radius for each neighborhood because there may be workers who are 
located exactly on the boundary for both the reference group of interest and the adjacent 
reference group.
23
 We construct hours worked by individuals in the outside ring in Figure 6.1, 
(0.2, 0.6], which has an average of 226 observations for each instrument group. First-stage 
goodness of fit and Sargan test results for the regressions in Table 6.2 confirm that our 
instruments (for all three right-hand side endogenous regressors: after-tax wage, virtual income, 
and reference group average labor supplied) are valid in terms of passing the standard checks for  
instrument strength and overidentifying restrictions. Equivalently, the strength of our identifying 
instruments here means that the potential bias of the IV estimator of the endogenous social 
interactions effect in Table 6.1 is small: less than 4 percent of  the potential bias of OLS (Hahn 
and Hausman 2003; Stock and Yogo 2005). 
6.6.3 Additional Econometric Validity Checks of the Reference Group 
 In Grodner and Kniesner (2008c) we examine how our results may or may not be robust 
to the sizes of the reference group or adjacent groups comprising the instrument set. How might 
our results change by (1) shrinking the outer circle boundary in Figure 6.1, which leaves the 
reference group size the same but decreases the number of observations viewed as nearest 
                                               
23. The result stems from symmetric boundaries around each member. We thank Dan Black for 
that observation. 
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neighbors for the reference group, or change by (2) shrinking the inner reference group circle 
boundary in Figure 6.1, which makes the reference group smaller? 
In the first sensitivity experiment, as the instrument group shrinks the IV estimated social 
interactions effect is similar while becoming statistically less precisely estimated. Our 
interpretation is that the instrument loses power as the size of the instrument set shrinks. 
In the second sensitivity experiment, we find that when the reference group size shrinks 
the estimated social interactions effect is also unchanged although statistical efficiency of the 
estimate again decreases. We interpret the result of the second sensitivity experiment as 
indicating that the range for the reference group is well chosen because within the group there 
should be a similar level of interactions, and we are  just choosing a progressively smaller and 
small subgroup who still interact. 
 Having summarized the sensitivity of our results to instrument set as discussed in 
Grodner and Kniesner (2008c) we now turn our attention to the economic interpretation and 
policy implications of our estimated social interactions effects in male labor supply. 
6.7 Interpreting the Importance of the Estimated Social Interactions Effect  
 Social interactions in labor supply mean that individuals respond to others’ hours worked 
by an economically significant amount. A social interactions effect is  important because policy 
affecting the wages or another independent variable of a subgroup will not only affect the 
individual but also affect others in the reference group. We therefore focus on the direct versus 
the indirect effect of interdependence. In particular, we consider the consequences of 
interdependence for the estimated effect of wages on labor supply, which economists use widely 
in welfare effect simulations of tax reform proposals (Kniesner and Ziliak 2008). 
 Taking the mean values in equation (6.1) and focusing on hours worked and wages, 
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1
1
1
1
h h h   

   

,                                       (6.2) 
where  11/ 1   is known as the global social multiplier because it represents the effect of social 
interactions at the highest level of aggregation (Glaeser et al. 2003). The total uncompensated 
effect of a wage change in the static linear model can be decomposed into 
                                          1
1 1
/
1 1
h

 
 
    
 
,                                          (6.3) 
where  is the exogenous effect, and    1 1/ 1   is the endogenous effect. Notice that the 
endogenous effect depends on both the magnitude of the initial exogenous change and the social 
multiplier. 
 Multiplying equation (6.3) by / h  the uncompensated elasticity is 
                                      , , ,hw total hw exogenous hw endogenous    ,                                      (6.4) 
where , /hw exogenous h   and  , 1 1/ 1hw endogenous h     . For 1 0.5   the exogenous effect 
is larger than the endogenous effect, but for 
1 0.5   the endogenous effect is larger. As we will 
later emphasize, the decomposition in (6.4) underscores how ignoring labor supply 
interdependencies may have serious consequences for the elasticity estimates of interest. 
 Using the values from the second column of Table 6.1, the total uncompensated wage 
elasticity of labor supply at the means is 0.22, with an exogenous part of 0.08 and an endogenous 
part of 0.14. In comparison, the baseline model results from column one of Table 6.1 are an 
uncompensated net wage elasticity of 0.13. If we purposely ignore social interactions the 
estimated exogenous wage effect is about 60 percent too high; the positive bias in the canonical 
model happens because the single (wage) coefficient estimate also imbeds the effect of labor 
supply interdependencies. The twin findings that (1) the wage elasticity has two unequal and 
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sizeable parts in the social interactions model and that (2) the wage coefficient of the traditional 
model has sizeable omitted variable bias have important consequences for evaluating tax policy. 
6.8 Implications for Tax Policy Calculations 
 We have noted that numerical solutions to optimal income taxation need appropriate 
econometric estimates. Further, our core results are that for U.S. male labor supply a regression 
model that ignores spillovers in labor supply underestimates the wage elasticity of labor supply 
by about 40 percent; if one uses a social interactions model but ignores the endogenous 
interactions component one underestimates the wage elasticity by over 60 percent. 
 It is less obvious how we should apply estimates where the policy-maker considers wage 
elasticity segments with and without social interactions. Some back-of-the-envelope calculations 
for the proportional tax rate case are instructive. The preferred model in Table 6.1, column 2 
implies that a 10 percent comprehensive tax rate cut would raise male labor supply by as much 
as 2.2 percent when social interactions are considered; ignoring social interactions would lead to 
about a 60 percent under-estimate of the labor supply effect of the tax cut (0.8 percent). 
How can one use our decomposition of the total wage elasticity into its exogenous 
component (+0.08) and its endogenous social interactions component (+0.14) in policy 
calculations? Suppose there is a proportional tax rate change applied only to families with 
disabled children. The subpopulation affected would be relatively small and scattered 
geographically; the reference group effects could be ignored safely, and the appropriate elasticity 
to use would be closer to 0.08 than to 0.22. Alternatively, suppose we were discussing the effect 
of a proportional state income tax change on the highest earners in a state such as California, 
where many would live in the same area or interact regularly in business. Now feedback effects 
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would be present. The elasticity to use would then include non-negligible social interactions 
effects and would probably be closer to 0.22 than to 0.08. 
 The importance of gauging what is the correct elasticity in terms of the exogenous and 
endogenous parts is only useful if we can define whether or not a particular group will be 
affected by interactions. If the persons who are affected do not belong to the same reference 
group then most likely we would only observe the exogenous effect, and the elasticity would 
overestimated if we used an elasticity that contained both exogenous and endogenous 
components, which was the first example in the previous paragraph. If the tax reform applied to 
members of a reference group, though, then there would be a full-blown feedback effect, and the 
elasticity that used only an exogenous component would underestimate the total labor supply 
effect, which was the second example above. 
6.9 Summary 
 Our research uses the canonical (linear in means) model of labor supply that adds 
possible social interactions in hours worked. We flesh out the econometric nuances of testing 
whether an increase in hours worked by the members of the reference group increases hours 
worked for the individual (endogenous social effect). The reference group here contains persons 
who are economically close to each other. Our measure of economic distance uses factor 
analysis, which allows mapping multiple economic neighborhood variables into a two-
dimensional social space. Our identification strategy builds on the likelihood that some persons 
belong to more than one reference group so that their hours worked may be used to instrument 
for endogenous labor supply of individuals in the worker’s reference group. As in any other IV 
exercise we apply checks of instrument strength and that the overidentifying restrictions are 
satisfied. 
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 In our regression model of married men’s labor supply if social interactions are treated as 
exogenous there is no estimated effect of the reference group behavior on the individual worker's 
behavior. When we instrument mean hours worked of the reference group and include individual 
habits in labor supplied, we find a social interactions effect that is reasonable both statistically 
and economically. The estimated total wage elasticity of labor is 0.22, where about one-third is 
due to the exogenous wage change and two-thirds is due to social interactions effects. 
 The policy implications are that if one is to understand fully the labor supply and welfare 
effects of income taxes, which may be conditioned on demographic and location information, a 
model including social interactions is best. Equally important is a proper interpretation of the 
social interactions model results. We demonstrate how a mis-specified model or a properly 
specified model that is mis-applied can easily lead to mis-estimates of the labor supply effects of 
tax reform by as much as 60 percent. 
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7. Conclusion 
 Our goal has been to present a unified theoretical and empirical representation of social 
interactions as they pertain to labor supply and demand and demonstrate cases where current 
policy prescriptions are greatly altered by the presence of social interactions. 
We began by examining theoretically in Section 2 the issues of how a researcher 
estimates and subsequently interprets labor supply (and by extension earnings) equations. We 
considered a positive spillover from others’ labor supplied versus a possible need for conformity 
with others’ labor supplied. Qualitative and quantitative comparative statics results revealed how 
spillover effects increase labor supply and earnings uniformly while conformity effects move 
labor supplied toward the mean of the reference group so that labor supply becomes perfectly 
inelastic at a reference group average. We showed that when exogenous social interactions may 
be ignored, conventional wage elasticities are still relatively well estimated although structural 
parameters may not be. Omitting endogenous social interactions may seriously misrepresent the 
labor supply effects of policy. 
We next considered social interactions in demand side where the household’s demand for 
a good may be influenced by either a spillover effect from other consumers' choices or a 
conformity effect representing a need for making choices similar to others’. A positive spillover 
effect increases the demand for the good with interactions, and a conformity effect makes the 
demand curve pivot to become less price elastic. Spillover in consumption also increases the 
associated derived demand for labor while conformity in consumption makes the associated 
derived demand for labor less elastic. As in the case of labor supply social interactions can make 
us rethink policies to influence worker well-being via labor demanded. 
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An important aspect of labor market outcomes is how individual and community factors 
may influence the average length of poverty spells in ways that can complement (or counteract) 
income maintenance programs. We considered local economic conditions as reflected by the 
county unemployment rate and neighborhood spillover effects as reflected by the racial makeup 
and poverty rate of the county. Moving an individual from one standard deviation above the 
mean poverty rate to one standard deviation below the mean poverty rate (from the inner city to 
the suburbs) lowers the average poverty spell by 20–25 percent; the poverty spillover effect is 
equal in magnitude to the effect of changing the household head from female to male. 
We examined overall labor market outcomes and related economic policy further by 
modeling theoretically the socially optimal wealth distribution in a two-person two-good model 
with heterogeneous workers and asymmetric social interactions where only one (social) 
individual derives positive or negative utility from the leisure of the other (non-social) 
individual. The interdependence in utility can mitigate the need to transfer wealth to low-wage 
individuals and may leave them to be poorer by all objective measures. We do not claim that this 
is the most general situation but rather use it to demonstrate how social interactions complicate 
thinking about economic policy. 
 Lastly, we generalized how economic policy issues related to labor market outcomes are 
changed when there are household social interactions to consider and examine econometrically 
what we know about the importance of household interactions. After fleshing out the 
econometric details of implementing an empirical model with possible social interactions in 
labor supply we looked for a response of a person's hours worked to hours worked in the labor 
market reference group, which includes those with similar age, family structure, and location. 
We identify endogenous spillovers by instrumenting average hours worked in the reference 
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group with hours worked in neighboring reference groups. Estimates of the canonical labor 
supply model indicate positive economically important spillovers for adult men. The estimated 
total wage elasticity of labor supply is 0.22, where 0.08 is the exogenous wage change effect and 
0.14 is the social interactions effect. Ignoring or incorrectly considering social interactions can 
mis-estimate the labor supply response of tax reform by as much as 60 percent. 
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Table 4.1.  Effect of Heterogeneous Wage and Social Interactions in Worker 1 on the Optimal Distribution of Wealth.  
Positively Social Individual Is A Low Wage Worker (Delta = 0.01, Wage For Non-Social Worker [2] = 0.8702) 
 
  Equal Wealth Distribution Optimal Wealth Distribution Percent 
Welfare 
Loss due to 
Equality 
  Wealth 1 
/Wealth 2 
Earnings 1 
/Earnings 2 
Income 1 
/Income 2 
Utilities 1 
/Utilities 2 
Wealth 1 
/Wealth 2 
Earnings 1 
/Earnings 2 
Income 1 
/Income 2 
Utilities 1 
/Utilities 2 
 0.6500 1.000 0.549 0.665 1.064 5. 793 0.362 0.813 1.166 -0.126 
 0.7000 1.000 0.647 0.738 1.074 2.073 0.546 0.813 1.122 -0.029 
Wage for  0.7500 1.000 0.749 0.813 1.084 1.000 0.749 0.813 1.084 -0.000 
Worker 1 0.7700 1.000 0.790 0.844 1.088 0.758 0.835 0.813 1.070 -0.004 
 0.8000 1.000 0.852 0.890 1.094 0.489 0.973 0.813 1.051 -0.025 
 0.8500 1.000 0.957 0.968 1.105 0.190 1.224 0.813 1.022 -0.095 
 0.9000 1.000 1.064 1.048 1.115 -0.007 1.507 0.813 0.996 -0.200 
Table 4.2.  Effect of Heterogeneous Wage and Social Interactions in Worker 1 on the Optimal Distribution of Wealth.  
Negatively Social Individual Is A High Wage Worker (Delta = 0.01, Wage For Non-Social Worker [2] = 0.66319) 
 
  Equal Wealth Distribution Optimal Wealth Distribution Percent 
Welfare 
Loss due to 
Equality 
  Wealth 1 
/Wealth 2 
Earnings 1 
/Earnings 2 
Income 1 
/Income 2 
Utilities 1 
/Utilities 2 
Wealth 1 
/Wealth 2 
Earnings 1 
/Earnings 2 
Income 1 
/Income 2 
Utilities 1 
/Utilities 2 
 0.6500 1.000 0.955 0.972 0.874 19.423 0.488 1.301 1.031 -0.265 
 0.7000 1.000 1.127 1.079 0.884 3.963 0.767 1.301 0.983 -0.109 
Wage for  0.7500 1.000 1.303 1.189 0.894 1.843 1.094 1.301 0.941 -0.025 
Worker 1 0.7700 1.000 1.374 1.234 0.899 1.431 1.241 1.301 0.926 -0.009 
 0.8000 1.000 1.483 1.301 0.905 1.000 1.483 1.301 0.905 -0.000 
 0.8500 1.000 1.666 1.416 0.916 0.547 1.955 1.301 0.873 -0.022 
 0.9000 1.000 1.852 1.532 0.927 0.263 2.540 1.301 0.845 -0.082 
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Table 5.1.  Months in Poverty by Demographic Characteristics 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   # reports mean, standard deviation, and standard error 
   * - significant on 10% level, ** - significant on 5% level, *** - significant on 1% level
 All All White Black 
Black 8.3241 7.8052   
 (0.5753)*** (0.6576)***   
Female 1.6211 1.5908 1.1428 1.9586 
 (0.4719)*** (0.4710)*** (0.6309)* (0.6461)*** 
Femalehead 7.4910 7.6976 3.9786 9.4335 
 (0.9141)*** (0.9118)*** (1.1966)*** (1.2695)*** 
heduc_high -2.2339 -1.9627 -1.1465 -2.4839 
 (0.5511)*** (0.5506)*** (0.7116) (0.7735)*** 
agehead_0_25_ -4.9571 -4.8393 -2.6901 -6.2327 
 (0.6443)*** (0.6433)*** (0.8178)*** (0.9137)*** 
agehead_60_ 0.4824 0.4601 2.0198 1.4148 
 (0.9360) (0.9359) (1.3107) (1.2736) 
Married 1.3237 1.1952 1.2649 0.9186 
 (0.8969) (0.8956) (1.1290) (1.2706) 
County variables no yes yes yes 
Cubic age yes yes yes yes 
Moving indicators yes yes yes yes 
Censoring variables yes yes yes yes 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes 
State dummies yes yes yes yes 
Observations 27083 27020 8657 17227 
R-squared 0.2762 0.2820 0.2685 0.2861 
     
Average poverty 
length # 
38.73692 
(43.22962) 
[.2626836] 
38.7544 
(43.25611) 
[.2631508] 
28.36364 
(31.3008) 
[.3364122] 
44.46485 
(47.85173) 
[.36458] 
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Table 5.2.  Marginal Effects Using Parametric Duration Models (All Observations) 
      
 OLS right-censored OLS right-censored log 
OLS 
Uncensored Weibull 
duration 
Censored Weibull 
duration 
Black 7.8052* 6.8824 6.2969 17.5725 17.9110 
Female 1.5908* 0.4244 0.3618 2.8017 1.8383 
Femalehead 7.6976* 4.8837 5.1284 16.0670 13.2217 
heduc_high -1.9628* -2.3328 -3.0057 -3.9571 -4.1564 
agehead_0_25_ -4.8393* -5.8914 -5.2903 -9.4923 -11.8167 
agehead_60_ 0.4601 -1.4906 -0.5676 1.5212 0.1311 
Married 1.1952 -0.8606 -0.9543 2.5254 -0.9909 
% unemp 0.9334* 0.6754 0.6704 1.8992 1.8938 
% unemp^2 -0.0367* -0.0100 -0.0115 -0.0486 -0.0169 
% black 0.2032* 0.1808 0.0954 0.5039 0.4967 
% black^2 -0.0053* -0.0043 -0.0024 -0.0112 -0.0096 
% poor 0.6383* 0.5027 0.4831 1.3564 1.4126 
% poor^2 -0.0004* -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.01014 -0.0130 
      
Observations 27020 27020 27020 27020 27020 
median MSE 293.49 461.76 521.03 230.06 412.61 
Note1:  we report only coefficients because the standard errors may not be comparable between models and we could not obtain  them for the Weibull 
specification. 
Note2:  9238 spells are right censored. 
* - significant on 5% level      
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Table 6.1.  IV Regressions with Social Interactions  
Dependent Var: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Annual Hours 
Worked 
Baseline Social 
interactions 
and habits 
Only habits Only social 
interactions 
AfterTaxWage 66.6982* 38.5373 30.5734 81.6429** 
 (35.5604) (28.6798) (28.1246) (37.3766) 
VirtualInc −0.0031 0.0000 0.0011 −0.0055 
 (0.0058) (0.0047) (0.0045) (0.0061) 
IndVRG_0_2 −318.8201 −317.4740 −284.0008 −385.0609 
 (381.9788) (307.9343) (302.0874) (401.1535) 
AnnHSRG_0_2  0.6379**  1.3128*** 
  (0.2689)  (0.3532) 
Observations 910 910 910 910 
Sargan test   0.212  0.081 
P-value  0.645  0.776 
Identifying 
Instruments 
WageRate75 
NLIncome75 
WageRate75 
NLIncome75 
AnnHSORG_2_6 
IndVORG_2_6 
WageRate75 
NLIncome75 
WageRate75 
NLIncome75 
AnnHSORG_2_6 
IndVORG_2_6 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Endogenous variables’ coefficients in bold. F(Shea partial R2) = 53.0(0.189), 368.1(0.621), 51.9(0.188)   
Additional control variables in all equation: KIDSU6, FAMSIZ, AGE45, HOUSEQ, BHLTH, Constant 
Additional control variable in (2) and (3): AnnualHours75  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Figure 2.1. Baseline and Spillover with h = 2172,  = 0.113 
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Figure 2.2. Baseline and Conformity with h = 2172,  = 0.113
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Figure 2.3.    Labor Market Equilibrium When There Are Endogenous Versus     
Exogenous Social Interactions in Hours Worked Caused By a Spillover 
Effect 
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Figure 3.2.  Demonstration of the Effect of the Conformity Interactions on the Demand for 
good x with Different Functional Forms 
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Figure 3.1.  Demonstration of the effect of the spillover interactions on the 
demand for good x with different functional forms 
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 Figure 5.1a. White 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 5.1b. Black 
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 Figure 5.2a. White 
 
 
  
 
Figure 5.2b. Black 
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 Figure 6.1. Demonstration of the Identification Strategy for the Endogenous Social Interactions. 
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